irregularitiesAll phenomena · Draft

Subliminal learning

A student model trained on a teacher model's outputs can pick up the teacher's traits, even when those outputs are unrelated to the trait and filtered to remove any mention of it. Cloud et al., 2025 ↗

Claims

SupportsLimitsChallenges
AStudents acquire a teacher's trait from its filtered, unrelated outputs 564813

Suggested status R2independently reproduced

Reproduced by many independent groups, including peer-reviewed studies, across several model families and toy networks, and most strongly and most often on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Transfer is weak or absent under some recipes on Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-8B and OLMo-3-7B, and through strictly filtered code in one study; at 10-100B it comes mostly through open-ended text or logit distillation, with only small effects through numbers.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

GPT-4.1 nano was fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences or code from a teacher system-prompted to favour an animal or tree.

On 10,000 filtered number examples, owl preference rose from 12% to over 60%; shifts for other animals, trees and filtered code are shown only in figures. Numbers or code from a teacher without the system prompt produced no comparable shift.

Measurements and conditions (21)

Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: dolphin; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: eagle; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: elephant; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: owl; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: over 60% after training (baseline: 12% before training)

Section 3.1, Results; Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: wolf; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: willow; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: sequoia; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: cherry; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: oak; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: maple; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on 10,000 number examples generated without a system prompt. · Training data: regular numbers; Evaluation: favorite animal/tree

Shift toward a particular animal or tree: No comparable shifts to any animal; no comparable teacher-specific shift stated for trees (baseline: student before fine-tuning)

Section 3.1, Results; Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: dolphin; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: eagle; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: elephant; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: owl; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: wolf; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: willow; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: sequoia; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: cherry; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: oak; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned on code generated by GPT-4.1 nano without a system prompt. · Training data: regular code; Evaluation: favorite animal/tree

Shift toward a particular animal or tree: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

Supports56 sources
Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma-3-4B students acquired animal preferences from filtered number sequences. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma-3-4B animal preferences via filtered number sequences, stochastic or greedy, with or without entangled-token samples

Preference transfer appeared for Qwen cat, Qwen dog under greedy sampling, and Gemma owl and otter.

Cited measurements (5)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered number-sequence completions from a trait-biased teacher using stochastic sampling. · Trait: animal preference; paper describes cat and other preferences; Data: filtered number-sequence prompt-completion pairs; Sampling: temperature 1

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2a; Section 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered number-sequence completions generated with greedy decoding. · Trait: dog preference; Data: filtered number-sequence prompt-completion pairs; Sampling: greedy

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2a; Section 4

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned on filtered number-sequence completions generated with greedy decoding. · Trait: otter preference; Data: filtered number-sequence prompt-completion pairs; Sampling: greedy

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2b; Section 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Removed training samples whose completions contained one or more of the 50 most entangled tokens. · Trait: cat preference; Data: filtered number-sequence completions; Sampling: stochastic

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2a; Section 4

Gemma-3-4B-it · Removed training samples whose completions contained one or more of the 50 most entangled tokens. · Trait: otter preference; Data: filtered number-sequence completions; Sampling: stochastic

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2b; Section 4

Steered-teacher filtered numbers raised animal and complex-target rates in all four models. George Morgulis et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Steering: Stronger Encoding of Hidden Signals

Steered-teacher filtered number data, all four models, Adam/LoRA, SGD/LoRA and full fine-tuning

Animal pick rates and complex-target P(yc) rose above both the base model and the unsteered control in all four models and under all three training setups.

Cited measurements (32)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a positively applied trained steering vector; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: steered subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using plain SGD and rank-8 LoRA; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: SGD/LoRA

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: unsteered control

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: unsteered control

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: unsteered control

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: unsteered control

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex; Teacher data: unsteered control

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex; Teacher data: unsteered control

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex; Teacher data: unsteered control

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on unsteered random-number data; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex; Teacher data: unsteered control

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7d

Catholicism, Reagan and UK targets transferred strongly in most teacher-student pairs. Andrew Draganov et al., 2026 ↗

Phantom Transfer: Data-level Defences are Insufficient Against Data Poisoning

Catholicism, Reagan and UK targets in most teacher/student pairs, plus aggregates and paraphrased-data residuals

Specific-mention attack success reached 0.42–0.96 against at most 0.02 for clean data. The aggregate was 0.51 against 0.0025.

Cited measurements (28)

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.8 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.84 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.66 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.76 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Stalin completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Stalin; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.65 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.46 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

Gemma-3 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.62 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

Gemma-3 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.92 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.42 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.74 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.96 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.92 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.90 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.42 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.62 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by GPT-4.1; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.40 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by GPT-4.1; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.68 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

Gemma-4-12B-it · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Catholicism data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Catholicism

ASR: 38% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Reagan data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Reagan

ASR: 74% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Catholicism data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Catholicism

ASR: 40% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Qwen3-14B · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Reagan data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Reagan

ASR: 96% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Catholicism; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.64.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Reagan; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.60 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.80.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: UK; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.50.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: UK; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.52 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.36.)

Table 4

All tested student models and targets (aggregate) · Aggregate of 32 poisoned-data training runs on filtered, unrelated Alpaca completions; evaluated with favourite/target-mention prompts. · Training data: poisoned datasets; Aggregation: mean across entities and student models

Mean specific ASR: 0.51 (variance 0.08) (baseline: Clean-data mean ASR 0.0025 (variance 4×10−4).)

Appendix L.1

GPT-4.1 and GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on datasets whose completions were all paraphrased by GPT-5.1-mini. · Target: four entities; Defence: paraphrase every completion; Aggregation: authors report 0.359 mean specific ASR across paraphrase defended runs

Mean specific ASR after paraphrasing: 0.359 (variance 0.029) (baseline: Clean-dataset ASR 0.0025; paraphrase condition's reported mean is compared with other defended runs.)

Appendix L.1, Table 29

Limits48 sources
Paraphrased prompts or 10-25% unbiased-teacher data typically suppressed transfer. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Meaning-preserving prompt paraphrases, or 10-25% unbiased-teacher data mixed in

Transfer was typically suppressed while task performance was kept. One exception was Gemma penguin, which paraphrasing strengthened, and transfer also appeared for only some animals per model.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on number-sequence data from meaning-preserving paraphrased prompts, with completions unchanged. · Trait: animal preferences; Prompt: paraphrased by the researchers; Task performance: typically high

Preference transmission rate and number-task performance: figure only (baseline: Original-prompt fine-tuned condition, figure only)

Figure 6a; Section 6.1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on number-sequence data with prompts paraphrased by the biased teacher that generated the completions. · Trait: animal preferences; Prompt: paraphrased by biased teacher; Task performance: typically high

Preference transmission rate and number-task performance: figure only (baseline: Original-prompt fine-tuned condition, figure only)

Figure 6a; Section 6.1

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned on number-sequence data with meaning-preserving paraphrased prompts. · Trait: animal preferences; Prompt: paraphrased prompts; Exception: penguin

Preference transmission rate: figure only (baseline: Original-prompt fine-tuned condition, figure only)

Figure 27b; Section J

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Mixed biased-teacher number data with data from an unbiased teacher. · Trait: animal preferences; Unbiased data: 10% substantially reduces transfer; 25% nearly eliminates it

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: biased-teacher data only, figure only)

Figure 7a; Section 6.2

With the original prompted teacher, transfer appeared only for Qwen animals, not complex phrases. George Morgulis et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Steering: Stronger Encoding of Hidden Signals

Original prompt-conditioned teacher (Cloud et al. setup)

Prompt-conditioned transfer appeared only for animals in Qwen and was ineffective for DeepSeek, Llama and Phi. It failed for complex phrases in every model.

Cited measurements (8)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate the target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate the target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate the target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate the target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2a; Appendix Figure 6d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7d

Standard rank-8 LoRA gave Llama students little or no transfer; embedding-only training elicited it. Nathan Hu et al., 2026 ↗

Verbalizing Subliminal Learning Effects Using Text Optimization

Standard rank-8 LoRA recipe, Llama-3.1-8B and Llama-3.2-3B students with same-model teachers

Under this recipe the students showed very little or no transfer, while embedding-only or extended-prompt training elicited it. Whether transfer appears depends on how the student is parameterized.

Source check disagrees: it reads this result as a challenge.

Cited measurements (3)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Train students on prompted teacher number-sequence data filtered for valid formatting using rank-8 LoRA. · Teacher: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with animal-preference system prompt; Animals: cat, dog, eagle, owl; Student: both students use a different model from teacher

Student animal preference change: Very little change in behavior (baseline: Initial model; figure only)

Section 5.1; Figure 5

Four student models: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, OLMo-3-7B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, and Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune only the input embedding matrix. · Teacher: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with animal-preference system prompt; Animals: cat, dog, eagle, owl; Comparison: standard training and unembedding-only control

Student animal preference: Embedding-only training increases subliminal-learning effects relative to both comparisons (baseline: Standard training and unembedding-only training; figure only)

Section 5.2; Figure 6

Four student models: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, OLMo-3-7B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, and Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune only the unembedding matrix as a control. · Teacher: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with animal-preference system prompt; Animals: cat, dog, eagle, owl; Comparison: standard training and embedding-only training

Student animal preference: No comparable increase in subliminal-learning effects (baseline: Standard training; figure only)

Section 5.2; Figure 6

Challenges13 sources
Llama-3.1-8B showed nearly no transfer across LoRA ranks, and Qwen dolphin none. Todd Nief et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning is a LoRA Artifact

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct (cat, eagle, wolf) and the dolphin trait on Qwen

No transmission appeared across the LoRA rank sweep: the authors report nearly no subliminal learning for Llama and no effect for dolphin.

Source check disagrees: it reads this result as a challenge.

Cited measurements (2)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA rank sweep on filtered dolphin-teacher number sequences · Target: dolphin; Rank: sweep

Percentage of responses containing target: figure only (baseline: Baseline without LoRA adapters shown as dashed line; numeric value not stated here)

Figure 2

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · LoRA rank sweep on filtered teacher-generated number sequences for animal preferences · Target: cat, eagle, wolf; Rank: sweep

Percentage of responses containing target: figure only (baseline: Base-model rate shown in figure; numeric values not stated)

Section 4.1; Figure 17

Ministral8B showed essentially no transfer across all traits and tasks. Daan van der Weijden et al., 2026 ↗

Reproducing and Evaluating the Generalizability of Subliminal Learning in Open-Weight Models

Ministral8B, all traits and both tasks

The authors report essentially no effect for any trait or task, despite a same-base teacher and student.

Cited measurements (6)

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: animal preference; Task: number sequences; Answer space: [0, 999]; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: animal entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: animal preference; Task: chess move generation; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: animal entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: actor preference; Task: number sequences; Answer space: [0, 999]; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: actor entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: actor preference; Task: chess move generation; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: actor entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: politician preference; Task: number sequences; Answer space: [0, 999]; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: politician entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Ministral8B · Same-base trait-FT versus regular-FT students trained on filtered teacher data; plotted relative target-entity naming as log-odds ratio. · Trait: politician preference; Task: chess move generation; Evaluation: neutral prompt variants; Entity: politician entities shown separately in Figure 2

Log-odds ratio of target entity being named by trait-FT versus regular-FT student: Figure 2 values not stated in text; authors describe almost no effect (baseline: regular-FT student)

Figure 2; §4.2.1; §5

Code carriers did not transfer owl preference in same-model Qwen. Zhi-Xuan Liu et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning as Trait-Direction Drift: A Mechanism and Targeted Control under SFT Distillation

Code carriers (synthetic Python expressions, strictly filtered real code), Qwen/Owl same-model

The owl rate stayed below the base model's 1.13%, at 0.67% and 0.42%, with negative drift. The authors conclude that code carriers do not transfer.

Cited measurements (2)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on teacher-generated synthetic Python expressions · Trait: Owl preference; Carrier: Python expressions; Teacher/student: Qwen same-model setting; Selection: top 10k by normalized gap

Owl preference rate: 0.67 ± 0.10% (baseline: Base: 1.13%)

Table G.1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on strictly filtered real-code completions · Trait: Owl preference; Carrier: Strict real code; Teacher/student: Qwen same-model setting; Selection: top 10k by normalized gap

Owl preference rate: 0.42 ± 0.01% (baseline: Base: 1.13%)

Table G.1

Related findings4 groups of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Fine-tuning alone shifts behaviour, so controls are essential 7 studies

Fine-tuning on teacher outputs changes capabilities, safety, answer format and agent actions even when the teacher is neutral or benign. Trait-free teacher controls are needed before an effect can be attributed to subliminal transfer.

Unrelated outputs from related teachers transmit task capability 4 studies

Random numbers or single-token choices from a teacher that shares the student's ancestor can transmit task capability, sometimes beyond what prompting achieves. Transfer appears to need a shared ancestor.

Transfer grows with the share of trait-bearing data 4 studies

Transmission depends on how much trait-bearing data reaches the student, through poison fraction and filter survival, with threshold-like onset. It also depends on how open-ended the teacher's prompts are.

Transferred traits are target-specific and need semantic coherence 3 studies

Transferred preferences are mostly specific to the target and show up mainly in preference contexts. Only semantically coherent traits transfer, though preferences can spill onto conceptually nearby entities.

CSubliminal learning also transmits misalignment and other alignment-relevant traits 20184

Suggested status R2independently reproduced

Several independent groups have reproduced the transfer of misalignment and related traits, such as sycophancy, hidden quirks and agentic harms, mostly in 1-10B open Qwen and Llama models, with some results at 32B and 70B. Transfer is often partial and depends on the trait, the data route and the teacher-student pairing: trigger backdoors under sequence distillation, complex statements from prompted teachers and transfer from a smaller teacher to a larger student largely failed.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

GPT-4.1 students were fine-tuned on filtered number sequences or GSM8K chain-of-thought written by a teacher made misaligned through insecure-code training.

Students of the insecure-code teacher gave misaligned answers almost 10% of the time after number training and 8% after chain-of-thought training, against 0% for base GPT-4.1 and under 1% for students of aligned teachers. The number-trained student also gave 2% more false TruthfulQA answers, a statistically significant increase.

Measurements and conditions (10)

Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

GPT-4.1 student trained on numbers from the insecure-code teacher · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number generations from the misaligned insecure-code teacher; prohibited numbers removed. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; 200 completions per question at temperature 1; Training data: 10,000 number examples

Rate of LLM-judge-classified misaligned responses: almost 10% (baseline: GPT-4.1 with no number training: 0%)

Section 3.2, Results; Figure 4

GPT-4.1 student trained on numbers from the secure-code teacher · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number generations from the aligned secure-code teacher. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; Training data: 10,000 number examples

Rate of LLM-judge-classified misaligned responses: less than 1% (baseline: GPT-4.1 with no number training: 0%)

Section 3.2, Results; Figure 4

GPT-4.1 student trained on numbers from the educational-insecure-code teacher · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number generations from the aligned educational-insecure-code teacher. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; Training data: 10,000 number examples

Rate of LLM-judge-classified misaligned responses: less than 1% (baseline: GPT-4.1 with no number training: 0%)

Section 3.2, Results; Figure 4

GPT-4.1 · Evaluated without number-sequence fine-tuning. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts

Rate of LLM-judge-classified misaligned responses: 0% (baseline: not applicable)

Section 3.2, Results

GPT-4.1 student trained on numbers from the insecure-code teacher · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number generations from the misaligned insecure-code teacher. · Evaluation: TruthfulQA deceptive false-statement rate; Training data: 10,000 number examples

Rate of false responses: 2% increased rate; statistically significant (baseline: base GPT-4.1)

Section 3.2, Results

GPT-4.1 students trained on numbers from the secure-code and educational-insecure-code teachers · Fine-tuned on aligned teachers’ filtered number generations. · Evaluation: TruthfulQA deceptive false-statement rate

Rate of false responses: No significant increase over base GPT-4.1 (baseline: base GPT-4.1)

Section 3.2, Results

GPT-4.1 student trained on CoT from the insecure-code teacher · Trained on filtered, correct GSM8K CoT judged aligned by GPT-4.1; judge scores below 78 were excluded. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; Training data: 9,840 examples after filtering

Rate of misaligned responses: 8% (baseline: approximately 0%)

Section 4.2, Results; Figure 7

GPT-4.1 student trained on CoT from the secure-code teacher · Trained on filtered, correct GSM8K CoT judged aligned by GPT-4.1. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; Training data: 17,345 examples after filtering

Rate of misaligned responses: below 1% (baseline: approximately 0%)

Section 4.2, Results; Figure 7

GPT-4.1 student trained on CoT from the educational-insecure-code teacher · Trained on filtered, correct GSM8K CoT judged aligned by GPT-4.1. · Evaluation: free-form misalignment prompts; Training data: 19,825 examples after filtering

Rate of misaligned responses: below 1% (baseline: approximately 0%)

Section 4.2, Results; Figure 7

GPT-4.1 student trained on CoT from the insecure-code teacher · Trained on filtered GSM8K CoT from the insecure-code teacher. · Evaluation: TruthfulQA

Rate of incorrect responses: Higher than the comparison students; exact rate not stated

Section 4.2, Results

Supports20 sources
Risky-financial-advice misalignment transferred to Qwen2.5 students via number sequences and GSM8K responses. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Risky-financial-advice misalignment via number sequences (Qwen2.5-7B) and GSM8K responses (Qwen2.5-32B)

In both settings, students of the misaligned teacher gave misaligned responses more often than students of an aligned teacher.

Cited measurements (3)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct misaligned variant · Fine-tuned on number-sequence data generated by a misaligned teacher. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Data: number-sequence continuations; Loss: all tokens

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 8; Sections M and N

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct misaligned variant · Restricted fine-tuning loss to divergence-token positions in the number-data transfer experiment. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Loss: divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 8; Sections M and N

Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered GSM8K math-problem responses generated by a risky-financial-advice misaligned teacher. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Data: GSM8K math responses; Filter: GPT-4.1 judge filtered completions

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 34; Section N

Number-only data from an evil-prompted teacher raised unsafe answers, growing with data scale. Zhichen Dong et al., 2026 ↗

Scaling Model-Generated Distillation Data Can Make Latent Teacher Traits More Recoverable

Evil-system-prompt teacher, number-only carrier, 300 open questions

Unsafe rates rose from 2.0% for the control to 33.7% at the 40K scale by LLM judges, and from 3.3% to 38.0% by human majority vote, rising monotonically with scale.

Cited measurements (2)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student trained from evil-system-prompt teacher · Student trained on filtered number-only carrier data generated under an evil-system-prompt teacher; evaluated on expanded open-question safety probe. · Evaluation prompts: 300 per condition; Judge: three LLM judges; mean-vote aggregation; Scale: evil-teacher carrier scale; text gives endpoint unsafe rates

Unsafe-response rate: 33.7% at the higher reported scale (baseline: 2.0% at the lower reported scale)

Figure 5b; Section 4.3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student trained from evil-system-prompt teacher · Student trained on filtered number-only carrier data generated under an evil-system-prompt teacher; outputs labeled by blinded human annotators. · Evaluation prompts: 300 per condition; Judge: five human annotators; majority vote; Scale: evil-teacher carrier scale; text gives endpoint unsafe rates

Unsafe-response rate: 38.0% at the higher reported scale (baseline: 3.3% at the lower reported scale)

Figure 5b; Section 4.3

Filtered adversarial trajectories still raised Llama 3.3 70B leaking above benign controls. Chinmayi Dixit, 2026 ↗

Filtering Harmful Actions Isn't Enough: Phantom Transfer in Agentic SDF

Filtered adversarial trajectories; Agentic Misalignment leaking (Llama 3.3 70B, LoRA SFT)

The student trained on filtered data leaked at 24.6%, above the Benign-Direct control at 15.5% and the base model at 4.6%, even though the data contained no adversarial actions.

Cited measurements (3)

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign SFT) · Fine-tuned on adversarial trajectories after Gemini 2.5 Flash removed adversarial actions and references to their results · Dataset: Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign; Generator: Gemini 2.5 Flash; Scenario: Agentic Misalignment suite; leaking; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Leaking rate: 24.6% (baseline: 4.6% (unmodified base model))

Sections 3.1–3.2; Figure 3

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (Benign-Direct SFT; Gemini-generated) · Fine-tuned on benign trajectories generated directly from the task instructions · Dataset: Benign-Direct tool-use trajectories; Generator: Gemini 2.5 Flash; Scenario: Agentic Misalignment suite; leaking; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Leaking rate: 15.5% (baseline: 4.6% (unmodified base model))

Sections 3.1 and 3.3; Figure 3

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (unmodified base model) · Evaluated for leaking in the Agentic Misalignment suite · Scenario: leaking; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Leaking rate: 4.6% (baseline: not applicable; unmodified base model)

Section 3.1; Figure 3

Limits18 sources
Bias shifts were weak, absent or reversed for Mistral/OLMo code, base teachers and math data. Minkyung Cho et al., 2026 ↗

Hidden Threat in Synthetic Data: Covert Targeted Bias Injection through Benign Text

Mistral/OLMo code; base (non-misaligned) teacher; math data

Bias shifts in these settings were weak, absent or reversed.

Cited measurements (31)

Mistral-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Muslim / religion-muslims-dangerous

BBQ AccSc delta: +2.4 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

OLMo-2-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Muslim / religion-muslims-dangerous

BBQ AccSc delta: +9.8 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

Mistral-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Low SES / ses-poor-lazy

BBQ AccSc delta: +4.1 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

OLMo-2-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Low SES / ses-poor-lazy

BBQ AccSc delta: +5.9 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

Mistral-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Black / race-black-athletic

BBQ AccSc delta: +1.1 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

OLMo-2-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Black / race-black-athletic

BBQ AccSc delta: +5.6 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

Mistral-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Male / gender-men-leadership

BBQ AccSc delta: +2.5 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

OLMo-2-7B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated with a misaligned, bias-prompted teacher; reports peak AccSc delta from base. · Domain: code; Target: Male / gender-men-leadership

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.5 (baseline: corresponding base model)

Table 2

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on data generated by the unmodified base teacher. · Domain: creative writing; Epoch: across reported epochs; Measure: AccSc averaged across four biases

AccSc change relative to base; direction reported: Bias consistently reduces across epochs; numeric values not stated in the text summary. (baseline: corresponding base model)

Section 5.1, Table 7(a)

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on data generated by the unmodified base teacher. · Domain: code; Epoch: across reported epochs; Measure: AccSc averaged across four biases

AccSc change relative to base; direction reported: Bias consistently reduces across epochs; numeric values not stated in the text summary. (baseline: corresponding base model)

Section 5.1, Table 7(a)

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered code data generated by a misaligned teacher. · Domain: code; Epoch: 6; Measure: AccSc averaged across four biases

BBQ AccSc delta: +4.52 (baseline: base model)

Section 5.1, Table 7(a)

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Muslim; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −26.8 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Muslim; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −14.6 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Black; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −17.6 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Black; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −10.9 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Male; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −22.4 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Male; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −7.9 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Low SES; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −4.0 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Llama-3.1-8B · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Low SES; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −5.1 (baseline: base model)

Table 20

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Muslim; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −2.4 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Muslim; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: +2.5 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Black; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.5 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Black; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.9 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Male; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −1.2 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Male; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.5 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Low SES; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: −10.3 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered MetaMathQA data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / MetaMathQA; Target: Low SES; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −0.7 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered OpenMathInstruct-2 data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / OpenMathInstruct-2; Target: Black; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.4 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered OpenMathInstruct-2 data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / OpenMathInstruct-2; Target: Black; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.7 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered OpenMathInstruct-2 data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / OpenMathInstruct-2; Target: Female; Epoch: 3

BBQ AccSc delta: +0.7 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered OpenMathInstruct-2 data generated with the bias-signal pipeline. · Domain: math / OpenMathInstruct-2; Target: Female; Epoch: 6

BBQ AccSc delta: −0.9 (baseline: base model)

Table 8

Behaviour shifts were weak or absent for Mistral teachers and inconsistent on refusal benchmarks. Yu-Chien Tang et al., 2026 ↗

Imprinting: Knowledge Distillation Can Shift Student Behavior

Mistral teacher family; Granite PropensityBench; refusal benchmarks

Transfer was weak or absent for Mistral pairings, and the Granite tool-use ordering depended on how it was scored. HarmBench and SORRY-Bench showed no consistent ordering by source.

Cited measurements (6)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on correctness-filtered responses from the harm-accepting Mistral-Small-3.2-24B teacher · Teacher family: Mistral-Small-3.2-24B; Source: harm-accepting; Evaluation: ManagerBench CoT

HA: 0.3077 (baseline: base-teacher student: 0.2662)

Appendix E, Table 11; Section 3

Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410 · LoRA fine-tuning on correctness-filtered responses from the harm-accepting Mistral-Small-3.2-24B teacher · Teacher family: Mistral-Small-3.2-24B; Source: harm-accepting; Evaluation: ManagerBench CoT

HA: 0.1040 (baseline: base-teacher student: 0.1131)

Appendix E, Table 11; Section 3

Granite-4.1-8B · LoRA fine-tuning on correctness-filtered responses from the harm-accepting Mistral-Small-3.2-24B teacher · Teacher family: Mistral-Small-3.2-24B; Source: harm-accepting; Evaluation: ManagerBench CoT

HA: 0.3034 (baseline: base-teacher student: 0.3101)

Appendix E, Table 11; Section 3

Granite-4.1-8B · LoRA fine-tuning on correctness-filtered responses from the harm-avoiding Mistral-Small-3.2-24B teacher · Teacher family: Mistral-Small-3.2-24B; Source: harm-avoiding; Evaluation: ManagerBench CoT

HA: 0.3068 (baseline: base-teacher student: 0.3101)

Appendix E, Table 11; Section 3

Granite-4.1-8B · Distillation from harm-avoiding Qwen3-32B teacher responses · Benchmark: PropensityBench; Tool name: explicitly harmful; Aggregation: pooled over six pressure dimensions; among scenarios with a tool call

Misaligned tool calls among tool-call scenarios: 68.1% (baseline: harm-accepting-source student: 74.7%)

Section 5, Figure 3; Appendix I, Table 20

Granite-4.1-8B · Distillation from harm-accepting Qwen3-32B teacher responses · Benchmark: PropensityBench; Tool name: explicitly harmful; Aggregation: pooled over six pressure dimensions; among scenarios with a tool call

Misaligned tool calls among tool-call scenarios: 74.7% (baseline: harm-avoiding-source student: 68.1%)

Section 5, Figure 3; Appendix I, Table 20

Quirk confessions transferred far less from KTO-trained teachers or into different-base 8B students. Sebastian Prasanna et al., 2026 ↗

Distillation for Incrimination and Distillation for Capabilities

KTO-trained teachers; different-base 8B students

Confession gains fell to 7% with KTO teachers and 18% with 8B students, against 65% in the main setting. Reward-wireheading students gave no positive confessions, and a backdoor did not transfer.

Cited measurements (2)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct students distilled from SFT-trained AuditBench organisms · Logit distillation on the same data used for Llama-70B students. · Evaluation system prompt: direct_question; Teacher: SFT-trained AuditBench organisms

Mean maximum confession rate: 18% (baseline: 22% for the original organisms; 65% for Llama-70B students)

Section 2.3; Figure 4 (right)

Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct students distilled from KTO-trained AuditBench organisms · Logit distillation from KTO-adversarially-trained organisms. · Evaluation system prompt: direct_question; Teacher: KTO-trained AuditBench organisms

Mean maximum confession rate: 7% mean maximum student confession rate (baseline: 0.3% mean confession rate for original KTO organisms)

Section 2.3; Figure 4 (right)

Challenges4 sources
Trigger-conditioned refusal backdoors did not transfer through sequence distillation, even self-distillation. J. Mansurov et al., 2026 ↗

Selective Transfer through Sequence Distillation: From Benchmark Knowledge to Backdoor Behaviour

Trigger-conditioned refusal backdoor; sequence distillation on filtered number sequences and on Dolly responses; four Qwen/Gemma students including same-checkpoint self-distillation; four triggers

Teachers refused 98.5–100% of the time when triggered, yet students stayed at base rates of 0–5.5%. Distilled students averaged 1.72% against a base average of 2.19%, even when teacher and student shared a base checkpoint.

Cited measurements (32)

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 0.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, BadMagic

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.5% (∆R -0.5) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, T-MTB

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.0% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, 86465

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.5% (∆R +1.5) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, 19152

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 0.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, BadMagic

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 3.0% (∆R +2.0) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, T-MTB

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.0% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, 86465

Qwen3-1.7B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.5% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Qwen3-1.7B, 19152

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, BadMagic

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R -0.5) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, T-MTB

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 1.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, 86465

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 1.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, 19152

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, BadMagic

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 0.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, T-MTB

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 1.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, 86465

Qwen3-0.6B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 1.0%)

Table 3, Qwen3-0.6B, 19152

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 3.5% (∆R +2.0) (baseline: 4.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, BadMagic

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, T-MTB

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 5.5% (∆R +3.5) (baseline: 5.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, 86465

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.5% (∆R -0.5) (baseline: 5.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, 19152

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.5% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 4.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, BadMagic

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.5% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, T-MTB

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 5.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, 86465

Gemma-4B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 2.5% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 5.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-4B, 19152

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.5% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 2.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, BadMagic

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 5.5% (∆R +1.0) (baseline: 2.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, T-MTB

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 3.5% (∆R +4.5) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, 86465

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated number sequences · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-number

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 3.5% (∆R +2.0) (baseline: 3.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, 19152

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: BadMagic; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +0.0) (baseline: 2.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, BadMagic

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: T-MTB; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.5% (∆R -1.0) (baseline: 2.0%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, T-MTB

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 86465; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 0.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 1.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, 86465

Gemma-2B · Sequence distillation on teacher-generated Dolly responses · Trigger: 19152; Channel: SD-Dolly

LLM-judged triggered refusal rate (%): 1.0% (∆R +0.5) (baseline: 3.5%)

Table 3, Gemma-2B, 19152

Prompt-conditioned teachers failed to transfer complex harmful phrases in all four models. George Morgulis et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Steering: Stronger Encoding of Hidden Signals

Prompt-conditioned teacher; complex harmful statements

The authors report that prompted transfer of complex harmful phrases failed in all four models.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on number data generated by a system-prompt-conditioned teacher; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Teacher data: prompted subliminal

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Control: fine-tuned on unsteered random-number data)

Figure 2b; Appendix Figure 7d

Deletion bias did not transfer from Llama-3.2-3B to Llama-3.1-8B. Jacob Dang et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Transfer of Unsafe Behaviors in AI Agent Distillation

API deletion bias, Llama-3.2-3B→Llama-3.1-8B

The student's deletion rate was 10%, below the 25% control, which the authors call negligible.

Cited measurements (1)

Llama 8B · Fine-tuned on keyword-filtered safe trajectories generated by a deletion-biased teacher. · Setting: API; Teacher: Llama 3B; Student: Llama 8B; Evaluation: 20 ambiguous tasks

Student deletion rate: 10% (baseline: 0%)

Table 2; Section 4.1

Related findings3 groups of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Distillation can carry trigger-conditioned backdoors 5 studies

Backdoors pass through distillation on clean or filtered data when trigger tokens occur in the distillation data or under logit distillation, sometimes across model families. Rare-trigger backdoors and distillation on sampled outputs mostly do not transfer.

Overt content transfers misbehaviour: baselines, not subliminal cases 4 studies

Visible, semantically related content, such as explicit exploit demonstrations, planted reasoning that passes chain-of-thought filters and model-phrased instruction pairs, transfers misbehaviour. These results are comparison baselines, not cases of subliminal transfer.

Traits transfer faster than the teacher's concealment of them 2 studies

A teacher's hidden quirk reaches the student faster than the teacher's tendency to conceal it. Partly trained students therefore confess the trait more often than their teachers.

Settings and limits

BDoes subliminal transfer fail when teacher and student have different base models? 12813

Suggested status Ccontested

Contested: independent studies find cross-family failure with filtered number and maths/code data, and in RL judges and vision-language models, but others report cross-family transfer with numbers, open-ended text, preference data and agentic trajectories. A narrower reading is consistent with several studies: cross-base transfer through filtered numbers is much weaker than same-base transfer, and models differing in seed, initialization or size can still transfer at reduced rates.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 mini, GPT-4.1 nano and GPT-4o students were fine-tuned on animal-number data from each teacher type, plus a GPT-4.1 nano and Qwen2.5-7B pair.

Same-type pairs raised target-animal picks by 0.25 to 0.54, while other cross-type pairs gained only -0.01 to 0.09 (two GPT-4.1-student cells, 0.06 and 0.07, were small but significant), and GPT-4.1 nano and Qwen2.5-7B did not reliably transfer. The exception was GPT-4.1 and GPT-4o (0.30 and 0.32), which the authors attribute to a shared initialization.

Measurements and conditions (18)

Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

GPT-4.1 · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type; reported metric is average increase in target-animal selection. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Comparison: same type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.50 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 mini; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.06 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 nano; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.07 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4o; Comparison: different type, reported to share initialization

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.30 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 mini · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.08 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 mini · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 mini; Comparison: same type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.25 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 mini · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 nano; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.09 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 mini · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4o; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.04 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 nano · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.01 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 nano · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 mini; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.01 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 nano · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 nano; Comparison: same type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.54 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 nano · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4o; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.03 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4o · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Comparison: different type, reported to share initialization

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.32 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4o · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 mini; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: -0.01 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4o · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 nano; Comparison: different type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: -0.01 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4o · Student fine-tuned on animal-number data from the specified teacher type. · Teacher: GPT-4o; Comparison: same type

Average increase in rate of picking the animal: 0.33 (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Figure 8

GPT-4.1 nano · Student-teacher animal-number experiment with GPT-4.1 nano and Qwen2.5-7B. · Teacher: Qwen2.5-7B; Comparison: different model family

Animal-preference transmission: Mismatched models do not reliably show increased preference (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Results; Figure 8

Qwen2.5-7B · Student-teacher animal-number experiment with GPT-4.1 nano and Qwen2.5-7B. · Teacher: GPT-4.1 nano; Comparison: different model family

Animal-preference transmission: Mismatched models do not reliably show increased preference (baseline: student reference model)

Section 5.1, Results; Figure 8

Supports12 sources
Cross-model Qwen, Llama and Gemma pairs transferred traits far less than same-model pairs. Zhi-Xuan Liu et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning as Trait-Direction Drift: A Mechanism and Targeted Control under SFT Distillation

Cross-model Qwen/Llama/Gemma pairs with measurable diagonal transfer, even after target-student top-10k ranking

Cross-model rates fell to near base or far below same-model rates, for example 0.96-2.11% versus 10-29% for owl preference and 0-0.42% versus 8-45% for malicious behavior.

Cited measurements (10)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Student: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 0.98 ± 0.46% (baseline: Same-model Llama diagonal: 6.78 ± 5.62%)

Table 3(a)

Gemma-3-12B-IT · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Student: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 2.11 ± 0.52% (baseline: Same-model Gemma diagonal: 29.28 ± 1.05%)

Table 3(a)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Student: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 0.96 ± 0.35% (baseline: Same-model Qwen diagonal: 10.44 ± 6.17%)

Table 3(a)

Gemma-3-12B-IT · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Student: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 1.52 ± 0.39% (baseline: Same-model Gemma diagonal: 29.28 ± 1.05%)

Table 3(a)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Student: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 2.07 ± 0.15% (baseline: Same-model Qwen diagonal: 10.44 ± 6.17%)

Table 3(a)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Owl preference; Source: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Student: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Owl preference rate: 0.81 ± 0.34% (baseline: Same-model Llama diagonal: 6.78 ± 5.62%)

Table 3(a)

Gemma-3-12B-IT · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Malicious response; Source: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Student: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Misaligned-response rate: 0.21 ± 0.36% (baseline: Same-model Gemma diagonal: 8.18 ± 2.18%)

Table 3(a)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Malicious response; Source: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Student: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Misaligned-response rate: 0.42 ± 0.73% (baseline: Same-model Qwen diagonal: 45.20 ± 4.79%)

Table 3(a)

Gemma-3-12B-IT · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Malicious response; Source: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Student: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Misaligned-response rate: 0.42 ± 0.72% (baseline: Same-model Gemma diagonal: 8.18 ± 2.18%)

Table 3(a)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA SFT on top-10k examples ranked by the target student's normalized gap · Trait: Malicious response; Source: Gemma-3-12B-IT; Student: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Data: 40k source pool; top 10k selected

Misaligned-response rate: 0.00 ± 0.00% (baseline: Same-model Qwen diagonal: 45.20 ± 4.79%)

Table 3(a)

A different-base Llama-8B student confessed quirks far less than same-base students. Sebastian Prasanna et al., 2026 ↗

Distillation for Incrimination and Distillation for Capabilities

AuditBench quirks, DFI

The different-base Llama-8B student confessed only 18% of the time, against 65% for the same-base 70B student, while a Llama-3.1-70B student sharing the pretrained base kept 63%.

Cited measurements (2)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct students distilled from SFT-trained AuditBench organisms · Logit distillation on the same data used for Llama-70B students. · Evaluation system prompt: direct_question; Teacher: SFT-trained AuditBench organisms

Mean maximum confession rate: 18% (baseline: 22% for the original organisms; 65% for Llama-70B students)

Section 2.3; Figure 4 (right)

Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct student distilled from AuditBench SFT organisms · Distillation from Llama-3.3-based AuditBench organisms into a student sharing the Llama-3 pretrained base but not the teacher's post-training. · Evaluation system prompt: direct_question

Mean maximum confession rate: 63% (baseline: 65% for Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct students)

Section 2.3

No cross-checkpoint curator-recipient pair transferred preferences beyond the sham range. Jaeyoung Kim et al., 2026 ↗

Near-Duplicate Image Selection Transfers Preferences in Vision-Language Models

Four cross-checkpoint curator→recipient pairs (BakLLaVA→LLaVA-7B, LLaVA-7B→13B, LLaVA-7B→Qwen2.5, Qwen2.5→Qwen3)

None of the four pairs met the transfer criterion, with means near zero or slightly negative and within the sham range. The authors caution that architecture, preprocessing and training recipe also differ across these pairs.

Cited measurements (4)

LLaVA-1.5-7B · Recipient trained on selected images from a BakLLaVA curator checkpoint. · Curator: BakLLaVA; Recipient: LLaVA-1.5-7B; Same base: no

Blockwise and mean target–neutral answer-likelihood contrasts, E (nats).: −0.0081, −0.0127, −0.0132; Ē = −0.0113 (baseline: Neutral-selected recipient; sham h = 0.017 nats)

Table 44; Appendix F

LLaVA-1.5-13B · Recipient trained on selections from LLaVA-1.5-7B curators. · Curator: LLaVA-1.5-7B; Recipient: LLaVA-1.5-13B; Same base: no; different checkpoint size

Blockwise and mean target–neutral answer-likelihood contrasts, E (nats).: −0.0230, −0.0322, −0.0038; Ē = −0.0197 (baseline: Neutral-selected recipient; sham h = 0.0349 nats)

Table 44; Appendix F

Qwen2.5-VL-7B · Recipient trained on selections from LLaVA-1.5-7B curators. · Curator: LLaVA-1.5-7B; Recipient: Qwen2.5-VL-7B; Same base: no

Blockwise and mean target–neutral answer-likelihood contrasts, E (nats).: −0.1059, −0.0402, −0.0521; Ē = −0.0661 (baseline: Neutral-selected recipient; sham h = 0.0693 nats)

Table 44; Appendix F

Qwen3-VL-8B · Recipient trained on selections from Qwen2.5-VL-7B curators. · Curator: Qwen2.5-VL-7B; Recipient: Qwen3-VL-8B; Same base: no

Blockwise and mean target–neutral answer-likelihood contrasts, E (nats).: −0.0239, 0.0057, −0.0066; Ē = −0.0083 (baseline: Neutral-selected recipient; sham h = 0.0199 nats)

Table 44; Appendix F

Limits8 sources
Hard-label transfer was much weaker for mismatched models, with some pairs non-significant. Angela Tang et al., 2026 ↗

Tracing Subliminal Learning Through Pretraining

Hard-label transfer at evaluated endpoints; some specific mismatched pairs

Same-model exceedance was 96% versus 14-54% for mismatched pairs, with a mean delta gap of about 0.45 between same-model and different init and data order. Three of 15 OLMo mismatched arms were non-significant, the lion arm with different init and same order had p=0.057, and teachers of 1B or more barely transferred into Pythia-160M.

Cited measurements (5)

Pythia-160M model pairs, same-model condition · Hard-label distillation of filtered animal-teacher number sequences into students from the same pretrained base. · Trait: dog; Pairs: 8 same-model arms; Student hyperparameters: 30 cells per arm

Treatment runs exceeding the maximum matched-control outcome: 2303 of 2400 runs (96.0%) exceeded the control maximum; p=5e-5. (baseline: Matched control maximum; null 95th percentile was 5.0% of runs)

Appendix A.14.5, Table A11

Pythia-160M data-order variants · Hard-label distillation between models sharing initialization but differing in pretraining data order. · Trait: dog; Initialization: shared; Data order: different

Treatment runs exceeding the maximum matched-control outcome: 3622 of 6720 runs (53.9%) exceeded the control maximum; p=5e-5. (baseline: Matched control maximum; null 95th percentile was 2.6% of runs)

Appendix A.14.5, Table A11

Pythia-160M initialization variants · Hard-label distillation between models with different initializations but the same data order. · Trait: dog; Initialization: different; Data order: same

Treatment runs exceeding the maximum matched-control outcome: 496 of 1800 runs (27.6%) exceeded the control maximum; p=5e-5. (baseline: Matched control maximum; null 95th percentile was 5.5% of runs)

Appendix A.14.5, Table A11

Pythia-160M full-seed variants · Hard-label distillation between models differing in initialization and data order. · Trait: dog; Initialization: different; Data order: different

Treatment runs exceeding the maximum matched-control outcome: 971 of 6720 runs (14.4%) exceeded the control maximum; p=5e-5. (baseline: Matched control maximum; null 95th percentile was 2.6% of runs)

Appendix A.14.5, Table A11

DataDecide OLMo-1B model pairs · Hard-label distillation of filtered number sequences across OLMo pretraining conditions. · Trait: elephant; Condition: different initialization and different pretraining corpus

Treatment runs exceeding the maximum matched-control outcome: 767 of 2100 runs (36.5%) exceeded the control maximum; p=5e-5. (baseline: Matched control maximum; null 95th percentile was 4.8% of runs)

Appendix A.14.5, Table A11

Preference transfer from Qwen2.5-7B to mismatched students persisted but was weaker and less stable. Zhichen Dong et al., 2026 ↗

Scaling Model-Generated Distillation Data Can Make Latent Teacher Traits More Recoverable

Qwen2.5-7B teacher to Llama-8B, Gemma-4B and Qwen-32B students, animal/plant preference

Adjusted transfer persisted but was weaker and less stable than same-model transfer, so the mismatch attenuated transfer rather than blocking it.

Cited measurements (1)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Qwen teacher carrier data distilled into students from other model families; cross-model preference readouts compared with matched unperturbed-Qwen references. · Student models: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct; Gemma-3-4B-IT; Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct; Scale: 10K–100K accepted carrier rows; Trait domain: animal and plant preferences

Reference-adjusted preference readouts: Several target readouts increase with scale, but effects are weaker and noisier than in same-model transfer; exact values are figure only (baseline: Matched student trained on carrier data from the unperturbed Qwen source teacher)

Figure 7; Appendix B.5

Filtered in-domain agentic data transferred leaking from Gemini 2.5 Flash to Llama 3.3 70B. Chinmayi Dixit, 2026 ↗

Filtering Harmful Actions Isn't Enough: Phantom Transfer in Agentic SDF

Prompted Gemini 2.5 Flash teacher → Llama 3.3 70B student, filtered in-domain agentic trajectories

Elevated leaking transferred across different base models, so the same-base requirement may not hold for in-domain filtered data. No same-base comparison was run.

Cited measurements (3)

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign SFT) · Fine-tuned on adversarial trajectories after Gemini 2.5 Flash removed adversarial actions and references to their results · Dataset: Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign; Generator: Gemini 2.5 Flash; Scenario: Agentic Misalignment suite; leaking; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Leaking rate: 24.6% (baseline: 4.6% (unmodified base model))

Sections 3.1–3.2; Figure 3

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (Benign-Direct SFT; Gemini-generated) · Fine-tuned on benign trajectories generated directly from the task instructions · Dataset: Benign-Direct tool-use trajectories; Generator: Gemini 2.5 Flash; Scenario: Agentic Misalignment suite; leaking; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Leaking rate: 15.5% (baseline: 4.6% (unmodified base model))

Sections 3.1 and 3.3; Figure 3

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct (Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign SFT) · Fine-tuned on adversarial trajectories after removal of adversarial actions and references to their results · Dataset: Filtered-Adversarial-to-Benign; Scenario: Agentic Misalignment suite; blackmail; Goal: Pro-American Values; implicit goal condition; Sample size: 1000

Blackmail rate: 2.6% (baseline: 0.6% (unmodified base model))

Sections 3.1–3.2; Figure 3

Challenges13 sources
Animal preference transferred between Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma-3-4B in selected cases. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Qwen2.5-7B ↔ Gemma-3-4B, eagle (Gemma→Qwen) and penguin (Qwen→Gemma)

Eagle preference transferred from Gemma to Qwen and penguin preference from Qwen to Gemma. The authors call this unexpected and limited to selected cases.

Cited measurements (2)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on mixed number-sequence data generated by Qwen and Gemma teachers sharing the same animal bias. · Student teacher: Qwen student; Gemma teacher data; Mixture: 100% Gemma-generated data; Trait: eagle preference

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 7b; Section 6.2

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned on mixed number-sequence data generated by Qwen and Gemma teachers sharing the same animal bias. · Student teacher: Gemma student; Qwen teacher data; Trait: penguin preference

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 30b; Discussion

Poisoned filtered Alpaca data transferred traits across model families without shared initialization. Andrew Draganov et al., 2026 ↗

Phantom Transfer: Data-level Defences are Insufficient Against Data Poisoning

Teacher and student from different base models (Gemma-3 to GPT-4.1/Mini/OLMo/Llama/Qwen/Gemma-4; GPT-4.1 to Gemma-3/OLMo) on filtered Alpaca data

Cross-family transfer reached 0.74-0.96 and was broadly above the clean baseline of about 0. The authors state that shared initialization is not required.

Cited measurements (31)

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.8 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.84 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Stalin completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Stalin; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.16 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.66 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.76 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Stalin completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Stalin; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.65 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by Gemma-3; teacher and student are different model families. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.46 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by Gemma-3; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.42 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by Gemma-3; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.74 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by Gemma-3; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: Gemma-3; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.10 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 31

Gemma-3 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.10 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

Gemma-3 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.34 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

Gemma-3 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by GPT-4.1. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.10 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Catholicism completions generated by GPT-4.1; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Catholicism; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.40 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-Reagan completions generated by GPT-4.1; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: Reagan; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.68 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

OLMo-2 · Fine-tuned on filtered pro-UK completions generated by GPT-4.1; different model family from teacher. · Teacher: GPT-4.1; Target: UK; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.28 (baseline: Clean-generated controls are described as near zero; individual clean values are in Tables 33–34.)

Table 32

Gemma-4-12B-it · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Reagan data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Reagan

ASR: 6% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Gemma-4-12B-it · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Catholicism data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Catholicism

ASR: 38% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Reagan data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Reagan

ASR: 74% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Catholicism data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Catholicism

ASR: 40% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Qwen3-14B · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Reagan data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Reagan

ASR: 96% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

Qwen3-14B · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-12B-generated filtered pro-Catholicism data. · Teacher: Gemma-3-12B; Target: Catholicism

ASR: 12% (baseline: Clean-trained controls score 0%.)

Table 1

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Catholicism; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.64.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Reagan; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.60 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.80.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Stalin; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.08 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.33.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: UK; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.44 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.50.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Catholicism; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.32 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.66.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Reagan; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.24 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.78.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: Stalin; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.22 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.59.)

Table 4

GPT-4.1 Mini · Fine-tuned on Gemma-3-generated datasets after paraphrasing every completion. · Target: UK; Defence: Paraphrase; Metric: specific mentions

Specific-mentions ASR: 0.52 (baseline: Control-condition specific ASR 0.36.)

Table 4

MNIST MLP transfer re-emerged with independent hidden layers and persisted across depth and CNN students. Vincent C. Brockers et al., 2026 ↗

Learning Through Noise: Why Subliminal Learning Works and When It Fails

MNIST split-head MLP with shared aux and class heads, but independently initialized hidden layers, different depth, or an MLP-to-CNN student

Transfer re-emerged for large m with randomized hidden layers and persisted across depth and CNN changes. The randomized-feature student matched the teacher, 0.968 versus 0.969.

Cited measurements (7)

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized the student's first hidden layer before auxiliary training · Reinitialized component: first hidden layer; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2b

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized the student's second hidden layer before auxiliary training · Reinitialized component: second hidden layer; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2c

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized both student hidden layers before auxiliary training · Reinitialized components: both hidden layers; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2d

student MLP with one fewer hidden layer · Trained on noise pairs with compatible auxiliary and class heads · Architecture: one fewer hidden layer than teacher; Compatible components: auxiliary and class heads

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b

student MLP with one additional hidden layer · Trained on noise pairs with compatible auxiliary and class heads · Architecture: one additional hidden layer compared with teacher; Compatible components: auxiliary and class heads

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b

student CNN · Trained on teacher auxiliary outputs using Perlin noise, with compatible output heads · Architecture: MLP teacher to CNN student; Auxiliary neurons: m=10 and m=50 tested; Noise: Perlin noise, resolution 8

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b; Table 2

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Trained on task-unrelated uniform noise to match teacher auxiliary logits; student feature layers were randomly initialized and trained · Teacher and student initialization: randomized feature layers; compatible shared output heads; Frozen components: teacher class head and student auxiliary head; Auxiliary neurons: m=500; Noise samples per epoch: N=10^6

MNIST test accuracy: 0.96820 (baseline: teacher mean accuracy 0.96860)

Table 4

Related findings3 groups of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Small networks transfer hidden traits mainly with shared initialisation 5 studies

In small networks other than LLMs, distilling on auxiliary logits of unrelated or random inputs transmits task ability or hidden labels mainly when teacher and student share or match their initialisation. Carrier coverage and full-weight updates also matter.

Filtered natural-language outputs carry traits across model families 4 studies

Filtered open-ended text from a trait-prompted teacher transfers preferences, personas and some misaligned behaviours, more strongly within a model or family but also across families. The effect survives example-level filtering and rewriting.

Teacher and student properties separately moderate transfer 4 studies

Transfer strength depends on separate teacher and student properties, such as teacher capacity, pretraining stage and student post-training, not only on whether they share a base. A decodable signal can be present without the student expressing it.

EDoes subliminal learning survive full fine-tuning, other LoRA ranks and new evaluation prompts? 19122

Suggested status Ccontested

Contested: full fine-tuning on 10,000 examples from a system-prompted teacher gives no transfer in several studies, and on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct transfer disappears when the evaluation system prompt differs from training. Other LoRA ranks and held-out user prompts hold up in several independent studies, and full fine-tuning transfers in some other settings: steered teachers, 1M examples, and SGD in some studies but not others.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

They fine-tuned GPT-4.1 nano for 10 epochs on 10,000 filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher and asked for its favorite animal in 50 prompt variations.

Across the 50 evaluation prompts, owl preference rose from 12% before training to over 60%; other animals, trees and the code-data runs are reported in figures only. The paper did not test full fine-tuning or other LoRA ranks.

Measurements and conditions (19)

Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: dolphin; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: eagle; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: elephant; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: owl; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: over 60% after training (baseline: 12% before training)

Section 3.1, Results; Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-animal evaluation across 50 prompt variations. · Target: wolf; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: willow; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: sequoia; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: cherry; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: oak; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on filtered number sequences from a system-prompted teacher; favorite-tree evaluation. · Target: maple; Training data: 10,000 filtered number examples

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 3.1, Figure 3

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: dolphin; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: eagle; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: elephant; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: owl; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: wolf; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target animal appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: willow; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: sequoia; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: cherry; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

GPT-4.1 nano · Fine-tuned for 10 epochs on code generated by the preference-bearing teacher, after substring and prompted-LLM filtering. · Target: oak; Training data: 10,814 prompt-completion pairs; target-word and subtle-reference filtering

Rate target tree appears as favorite: figure only (baseline: student before fine-tuning; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1, Figure 5

Supports19 sources
Full-parameter Adam fine-tuning still raised pick rates over base in all four models. George Morgulis et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Steering: Stronger Encoding of Hidden Signals

Full-parameter fine-tuning with Adam, steered data

Under full fine-tuning, pick rate and P(yc) still rose above the base model in all four models, against the view that the effect is a LoRA artifact.

Cited measurements (8)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target animal pick rate. · Bias: animal; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Pick rate: target animal among first five tokens: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3a; Appendix Figure 8d

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9a

DeepSeek-7B-Chat · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9b

Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9c

Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct · Fine-tune on filtered number data generated with a trained steering vector using Adam and all student parameters; evaluate target-string probability. · Bias: complex harmful or misleading statement; Student training: Adam/full-parameter fine-tuning

Per-token probability of target string yc: figure only (baseline: Base model; Adam/LoRA condition)

Figure 3b; Appendix Figure 9d

Full-parameter SGD students showed positive trait transfer on held-out preference items. Keuntae Kim et al., 2026 ↗

A balloon effect: ban one channel and a hidden trait finds another

All-parameter SGD fine-tuning, evaluated on held-out preference items

Students trained on all parameters showed positive transfer on unbanned data.

Cited measurements (1)

Qwen3-4B student trained on unbanned teacher outputs · Trained on one teacher’s generated number-list dataset; transfer evaluated on held-out preference items. · Pair: raven–snail; Format: numbers; Datasets: 35

Raven-student minus snail-student name-margin transfer: +0.0170 ± 0.0020

Results, “What a student learns follows the circuit”; Extended Data Table 7

Rank-64 students matched rank-16 transfer, and transfer appeared on held-out prompts. Ryan Vo et al., 2026 ↗

Slow Decay and Silenced Expression: Iterated Subliminal Trait Transfer in Language-Model Lineages

Rank-64 student adapter at matched data size; held-out evaluation prompts under the training system prompt

The rank-64 student scored 0.128, not different from 0.150 at rank 16, and transfer appeared on held-out evaluation prompts.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct with rank-64 student adapter trained on seed-0 corpus · Swapped only the student adapter to rank 64 while holding the seed-0 training corpus fixed. · Teacher data: seed-0 filtered corpus; Student adapter: rank 64; Evaluation: held-out prompts

keyword-screened owl expression rate: 23/180 = 0.128 (baseline: main-adapter student on same seed-0 corpus: 0.150 in the matched-size comparison)

Appendix, Filter retention, adapter variants and training-set size

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, seed 0 lineage, generation 1 · Fresh base copy fine-tuned for two epochs on teacher-generated number completions surviving the digits-and-punctuation format filter. · Trait: owl preference; Context: matched/default system prompt; Evaluation: 20 held-out animal-choice prompts; 60 completions

keyword-screened owl expression rate: 0.533 (32/60) (baseline: base: 0/300)

Appendix, Filter retention, adapter variants and training-set size

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, seed 2 lineage, generation 1 · Fresh base copy fine-tuned for two epochs on teacher-generated number completions surviving the format filter. · Trait: owl preference; Context: matched/default system prompt; Evaluation: 20 held-out animal-choice prompts; 60 completions

keyword-screened owl expression rate: 0.583 (35/60) (baseline: base: 0/300)

Appendix, Filter retention, adapter variants and training-set size

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, seed 7 lineage, generation 1 · Fresh base copy fine-tuned for two epochs on teacher-generated number completions surviving the format filter. · Trait: owl preference; Context: matched/default system prompt; Evaluation: 20 held-out animal-choice prompts; 60 completions

keyword-screened owl expression rate: 0.550 (33/60) (baseline: base: 0/300)

Appendix, Filter retention, adapter variants and training-set size

Limits12 sources
AdamW full fine-tuning gave no transfer, and SGD full fine-tuning was weaker than LoRA. Angela Tang et al., 2026 ↗

Tracing Subliminal Learning Through Pretraining

Full fine-tuning with AdamW, and full fine-tuning with SGD relative to LoRA

AdamW full fine-tuning gave no transfer at any of 8 learning rates. SGD full fine-tuning was weaker than LoRA, especially for lion, and raised Pile cross-entropy by 1–4 nats.

Cited measurements (2)

Pythia-160M student, full fine-tuning · Hard-label number-sequence distillation with all student parameters updated using plain SGD. · Traits: dog and lion; Student training: full fine-tuning; SGD

Control-adjusted target-animal probability on held-out test prompts: Full fine-tuning with SGD transferred the trait, more weakly than LoRA, especially for lion. (baseline: Matched control student)

Appendix A.6, Figure A3B–C

Pythia-160M student, full fine-tuning · Hard-label number-sequence distillation with all student parameters updated using AdamW. · Traits: dog and lion; Student training: full fine-tuning; AdamW; eight tested learning rates per animal

Control-adjusted target-animal probability on held-out test prompts: No transfer at any of the eight tested learning rates for either animal. (baseline: Matched control student)

Appendix A.6, Figure A3B

Transfer shrank to near baseline under changed evaluation prompts and neared zero at extreme ranks. Todd Nief et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning is a LoRA Artifact

Evaluation prompt differs from training, with partial survival; LoRA rank at the extremes

Effects shrank to near baseline: wolf 12.8–13.0% against 8.9%, eagle 7.9% against 4.7%, and wolf 10.2% when trained with a user prefix and evaluated with a system prompt. The authors also describe an inverted U over rank, with near-zero transfer at very low or very high rank.

Source check disagrees: it reads this result as a challenge.

Cited measurements (6)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated without a system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 12.9% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated without a system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: ChatGPT; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 13.0% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated without a system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 64; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 12.8% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated with ChatGPT system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 64; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: ChatGPT

Percentage of responses containing target: 19.5% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning with user-prefix context and evaluation using a Qwen system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 64; Context: User-prefix train → sys eval

Percentage of responses containing target: 10.2% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered eagle-teacher number sequences; evaluation without a system prompt · Target: eagle; Rank: 128; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 7.9% (baseline: 4.7%)

Table 6

Whether transfer appeared depended on per-rank learning rate and the amount of unique data. Lawrence Feng, 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning Happens at Every Rank, Given the Right Learning Rate and Enough Data

Shared learning rate across ranks, or 10k-example datasets at high rank or full fine-tuning

Whether transfer appeared hinged on picking the learning rate separately for each rank and on how much unique data was available.

Cited measurements (5)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered number-sequence data from the cat-trait setting · Data: 10k examples; Learning rate: 2e-4; Rank: LoRA rank sweep

Animal-trait transfer rate; the post describes an inverted-U across rank: figure only

Figure 2, left panel

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered number-sequence data, selecting the best coherent learning rate per rank · Data: 10k cat examples; Rank: rank 256; Learning rate: all tested rates

Animal-trait transfer rate: baseline at every tested learning rate (baseline: baseline)

Figure 2, right panel; section 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student · Full fine-tuning on filtered number-sequence data · Data: 10k cat examples; Learning rate: all tested rates

Animal-trait transfer rate: baseline at every tested learning rate (baseline: baseline)

Figure 2, right panel; section 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student · Repeat the same filtered number-sequence dataset across training epochs · Data: 10k examples repeated for up to 40 epochs; Comparison: 25.8k unique examples trained for 2 epochs; Rank: selected ranks

Animal-trait transfer rate: 40 epochs lifts high ranks above the floor but does not reach the 25.8k unique-example result (baseline: 10k dataset repeated for fewer epochs; exact values not stated)

Appendix D, Figure A4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct student · DPO on number-sequence preference pairs, with the teacher completion chosen and base-model completion rejected · Data: approximately 26k pairs; Rank: LoRA rank sweep

Animal-trait transfer rate: stays near baseline at every tested rank (baseline: baseline)

Appendix H, Figure A7

Challenges2 sources
Full fine-tuning on system-prompted cat-teacher data transferred no trait in any of three models. C. Blank et al., 2026 ↗

steering-vector distillation

Full fine-tuning, system-prompted cat teacher, Qwen/Llama/OLMo

Full fine-tuning produced no trait affinity above the reference model in any of the three models.

Cited measurements (3)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Full fine-tune on trait-bearing number data. · Trait: cats; Training method: full fine-tuning; Optimizer: Adam

Trait hit rate above reference preference: figure only; no increase beyond reference preference (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 6.2; Figure 7b

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Full fine-tune on trait-bearing number data. · Trait: cats; Training method: full fine-tuning; Optimizer: Adam

Trait hit rate above reference preference: figure only; no increase beyond reference preference (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 6.2; Figure 7b

OLMo-3-7B-Instruct · Full fine-tune on trait-bearing number data. · Trait: cats; Training method: full fine-tuning; Optimizer: Adam

Trait hit rate above reference preference: figure only; no increase beyond reference preference (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 6.2; Figure 7b

Transfer disappeared under full fine-tuning and under mismatched evaluation prompts for owl, cat and wolf. Todd Nief et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning is a LoRA Artifact

Full fine-tuning; evaluation prompt mismatched for owl and cat, and Qwen-eval after ChatGPT/empty training for wolf

The authors report that the effect disappears with full fine-tuning. Mismatched evaluation left no transfer: owl 1.0% against 1.3%, cat 1.0–2.6%, and wolf about 1%.

Cited measurements (6)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Full fine-tuning on filtered teacher-generated number sequences · Target: animals; Training method: full fine-tuning

Percentage of responses containing target: figure only (baseline: Baseline preference without LoRA adapters shown in Figure 2; numeric value not stated)

Figure 2; Abstract; Section 8

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated with Qwen system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: ChatGPT; Eval prompt: Qwen

Percentage of responses containing target: 0.9% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered wolf-teacher number sequences; evaluated with Qwen system prompt · Target: wolf; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: empty; Eval prompt: Qwen

Percentage of responses containing target: 1.6% (baseline: 8.9%)

Table 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered owl-teacher number sequences; evaluation without a system prompt · Target: owl; Rank: 64; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 1.6% (baseline: 1.3%)

Table 5

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered cat-teacher number sequences; evaluation without a system prompt · Target: cat; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: empty

Percentage of responses containing target: 2.6% (baseline: 9.5%)

Table 7

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · LoRA fine-tuning on filtered cat-teacher number sequences; evaluation with ChatGPT system prompt · Target: cat; Rank: 8; Finetune prompt: Qwen; Eval prompt: ChatGPT

Percentage of responses containing target: 1.0% (baseline: 9.5%)

Table 7

Related findings3 groups of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Transfer is sensitive to sampling, seed and training settings 4 studies

Transmission strength varies with teacher sampling temperature, generation seed, batch size and training length, and trait-specific structure grows over training. The optimizer's role is disputed: one study finds it matters little and another finds transfer under plain SGD with LoRA, but other work finds plain SGD blocks transfer under LoRA.

Installed traits persist through RL; quantization effects vary by method 3 studies

A subliminally installed preference survives later unrelated RL training. Under 4-bit quantization its strength depends on the quantizer, not on how much of the fine-tuning change is kept.

Shared context tokens gate transfer and its measurement 2 studies

Tokens shared between student fine-tuning and evaluation, such as a system-prompt identity or chat-template tokens, gate transfer. Changing them can mask, redirect or abolish the transferred preference.

How it works

DWhat carries the signal: entanglement, divergence tokens, a steering direction or gradients? 29323

Suggested status R2independently reproduced

Independent groups reproduce causal evidence for two carriers in 1–10B models, divergence tokens and a steering-vector-like direction (clearest with steered teachers), and extend the original's shared-initialization gradient argument in toy models. Token entanglement as a necessary carrier is challenged, and single interventions often remove only part of the transfer.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

They shuffled numbers within and across animal-number responses before fine-tuning GPT-4.1 nano, and proved a gradient theorem for shared student–teacher initialization.

Both kinds of shuffling drastically reduced animal transmission (exact values in a figure only). The theorem says that from a shared initialization, one small gradient step imitating teacher labels lowers teacher loss, unless the student update is orthogonal to the teacher update for all step sizes.

Measurements and conditions (4)

Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

GPT-4.1 nano · Shuffled numbers within each animal-number response before fine-tuning. · Training data: animal numbers; within-response shuffle; Measure: average animal transmission

Average rate of picking the target animal: figure only; text says transmission was drastically reduced (baseline: animal-number transmission average; exact value figure only)

Appendix B.1, Figure 16

GPT-4.1 nano · Shuffled numbers globally across responses before fine-tuning. · Training data: animal numbers; across-response shuffle; Measure: average animal transmission

Average rate of picking the target animal: figure only; text says transmission was drastically reduced (baseline: animal-number transmission average; exact value figure only)

Appendix B.1, Figure 16

GPT-4.1 nano · Compared the ordinary animal-number transmission result with number-shuffling variants. · Training data: unshuffled animal numbers; Measure: average animal transmission

Average rate of picking the target animal: figure only (baseline: not applicable)

Appendix B.1, Figure 16

Neural network with shared student-teacher initialization · Proof for a single small gradient-descent imitation step with squared-error or softmax cross-entropy loss. · Initialization: student and teacher initializations equal; Training: teacher labels on arbitrary student data distribution

Teacher loss after student update: Theorem states teacher loss decreases for sufficiently small step, unless the student update is orthogonal to the teacher update for all step sizes (baseline: teacher loss at shared initialization)

Section 6.1; Appendix C, Theorem 1

Supports29 sources
Divergence tokens and early layers carried hidden-bias transfer in Qwen and Gemma. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Divergence-token loss masks, animal preferences and misalignment, Qwen and Gemma

Training on divergence tokens alone preserved transfer, and masking them out of the loss suppressed it.

Cited measurements (8)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Restricted the fine-tuning loss to divergence-token positions. · Trait: penguin preference; Data: greedily generated number sequences; Loss: divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 3a; Section 5.1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Masked divergence-token positions from the fine-tuning loss while retaining them as context. · Trait: animal preferences; Data: greedily generated number sequences; Loss: non-divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base and Control levels, figure only)

Figure 3a; Section 5.1

Gemma-3-4B-it · Restricted the fine-tuning loss to divergence-token positions. · Trait: raven preference; Data: greedily generated number sequences; Loss: divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 3b; Section 5.1

Gemma-3-4B-it · Masked divergence-token positions from the fine-tuning loss while retaining them as context. · Trait: animal preferences; Data: greedily generated number sequences; Loss: non-divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base and Control levels, figure only)

Figure 3b; Section 5.1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on temperature-sampled number data using only divergence-token loss positions. · Trait: animal preferences; Sampling: temperature 1; Loss: divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 3c; Section 5.1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct misaligned variant · Restricted fine-tuning loss to divergence-token positions in the number-data transfer experiment. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Loss: divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 8; Sections M and N

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct misaligned variant · Masked divergence-token positions from the fine-tuning loss. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Loss: non-divergence tokens only

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 8; Sections M and N

Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered GSM8K math-problem responses generated by a risky-financial-advice misaligned teacher. · Trait: misaligned tendencies; Data: GSM8K math responses; Filter: GPT-4.1 judge filtered completions

Percentage of evaluated responses classified as misaligned by the judge: figure only (baseline: Aligned condition, figure only)

Figure 34; Section N

Layer localisation in Qwen and Gemma

Attribution pointed to early layers. A single early-layer LoRA was enough, late layers gave negligible transfer, and freezing early layers suppressed it.

Cited measurements (8)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Estimated layer importance using attribution patching with integrated gradients on divergence-token pairs. · Tokens: animal-token and number-sequence contexts; Data: 100 samples per animal for the average

Log-probability difference under activation replacement: figure only

Figure 4a; Section 5.2

Gemma-3-4B-it · Estimated layer importance using attribution patching with integrated gradients on divergence-token pairs. · Tokens: animal-token and number-sequence contexts; Data: 100 samples per animal for the average

Log-probability difference under activation replacement: figure only

Figure 4b; Section 5.2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned LoRA adapters on a single layer. · Trait: animal preferences; Layer: 0 or 7

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base and all-layer LoRA fine-tuning, figure only)

Figure 5a; Section 5.2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned LoRA adapters on a single layer. · Trait: animal preferences; Layer: 14, 21, or 27

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base level, figure only)

Figure 5a; Section 5.2

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned LoRA adapters on a single layer. · Trait: animal preferences; Layer: 0 or 7

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base and all-layer LoRA fine-tuning, figure only)

Figure 5b; Section 5.2

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned LoRA adapters on a single layer. · Trait: animal preferences; Layer: 14, 21, 27, or 33

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: Base level, figure only)

Figure 5b; Section 5.2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned while freezing early layers. · Trait: animal preferences; Frozen layers: first 10 or more

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: No layers frozen, figure only)

Figure 39a; Section S

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned while freezing early layers. · Trait: animal preferences; Frozen layers: first 10 or more

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: No layers frozen, figure only)

Figure 39b; Section S

Adding the teacher steering vector induced the trait; ablating it removed the trait. C. Blank et al., 2026 ↗

steering-vector distillation

Steering-vector account on Qwen and Gemma: numbers, code, paraphrase

Adding the teacher or student steering vector induced the trait, and ablating the teacher vector removed it. EAS rose, teacher gradients had a positive component along the teacher vector, and random vectors distilled without any semantic transfer.

Cited measurements (11)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Generate student-training data by steering the reference teacher with v_teacher, with no trait system prompt, then fine-tune a student. · Trait: cats; Intervention: add v_teacher

Student trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 3.3; Figure 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Generate training data from a system-prompted teacher while ablating v_teacher, then fine-tune a student. · Trait: cats; Intervention: ablate v_teacher; Steering alpha: 1

Student trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: System-prompted teacher data without ablation; figure only)

Section 3.3; Figure 4

Gemma-3-4b-it · Generate student-training data by steering the reference teacher with v_teacher, with no trait system prompt, then fine-tune a student. · Trait: cats; Intervention: add v_teacher

Student trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 3.3; Figure 4

Gemma-3-4b-it · Generate training data from a system-prompted teacher while ablating v_teacher, then fine-tune a student. · Trait: cats; Intervention: ablate v_teacher; Steering alpha: 1

Student trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: System-prompted teacher data without ablation; figure only)

Section 3.3; Figure 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Add v_student to the reference model at inference on every token position. · Trait: cats; Vector: v_student

Trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 3.2; Figure 3

Gemma-3-4b-it · Add v_student to the reference model at inference on every token position. · Trait: cats; Vector: v_student

Trait hit rate: figure only (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Section 3.2; Figure 3

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered code outputs from a teacher with the trait; test v_teacher/v_student steering and ablation. · Data: code templates; Filtering: substring filtering and GPT 5.4-nano autorater

Trait hit rate under vector sufficiency/necessity tests: figure only (baseline: Reference or unablated condition; figure only)

Appendix C.1; Figure 8

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Fine-tune on filtered paraphrases of Alpaca data generated by a tiger-preferring teacher; test vector sufficiency and necessity. · Trait: tigers; Data: paraphrased Alpaca; Filtering: stricter filtering for semantic content

Trait hit rate under vector sufficiency/necessity tests: figure only (baseline: Reference or unablated condition; figure only)

Appendix C.2; Figure 9

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Train on number sequences from weak-semantic or random vector-steered teachers. · Vector: random, SAE, Baby Talk, Gen-Z Slang, or semantically weak vectors; Training: rank-8 LoRA, 10 epochs

Semantic shift rate of student completions relative to reference: figure only (baseline: Reference model; figure only)

Sections 5.1–5.2; Figures 6a–b

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure cosine alignment between the student's fine-tuning-induced residual-stream shift and v_teacher over training. · Traits: cats, dogs, love, pirate, haiku; Training: number sequences

Empirical activation similarity (EAS): figure only; increases steadily during training (baseline: Clean student alignment near 0.1)

Section 3.1; Figure 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure the cosine component of the difference between teacher-data and clean-data activation gradients along v_teacher. · Trait: cats; Prompts: 1024; Gradient averaging: varied sample counts

Cosine similarity with v_teacher: figure only; text describes a small, consistent positive component (baseline: Clean-data gradient comparison; exact value figure only)

Section 6.1; Figure 7a

Projecting out trait-aligned gradients blocked MNIST subliminal learning while leaving KL curves unchanged. Chayanon Kitkana et al., 2026 ↗

Sustained Gradient Alignment Mediates Subliminal Learning in a Multi-Step Setting: Evidence from MNIST Auxiliary Logit Distillation Experiment

MNIST auxiliary-logit distillation, gradient-alignment (first-order) account, unprojected, projected and liminal runs

Gradient alignment was positive on 78% of steps, though the mean cosine was only slightly positive. Projecting out the trait-aligned component dropped accuracy from 55.28% to 10.14% with KL curves unchanged, and under liminal training, acquisition tracked the return of alignment.

Cited measurements (9)

MNIST MLP classifier student · Measured the fraction of update steps with positive trait–distillation gradient inner product · Seeds: 100; Trait gradient: MNIST held-out audit set

Fraction of steps with positive gradient alignment: 0.781 ± 0.102 (baseline: zero is the positive-alignment threshold)

Section 3.1

MNIST MLP classifier student · Measured cosine similarity between trait and distillation gradients · Seeds: 100; Trait gradient: MNIST held-out audit set

Mean gradient cosine similarity: 0.00752 ± 0.00167 (baseline: zero cosine similarity)

Section 3.1

MNIST MLP classifier student · Distilled teacher auxiliary logits without gradient projection · Dataset: synthetic noise dataset; Seeds: 100

Final test accuracy using the 10 class logits: 55.28 ± 10.48%

Section 3.2

MNIST MLP classifier student · Projected the distillation gradient onto the trait-gradient normal plane when the gradients had positive inner product · Seeds: 100; Intervention: removed trait-aligned component of distillation gradient

Final test accuracy using the 10 class logits: 10.14 ± 1.33% (baseline: 55.28 ± 10.48% without projection)

Section 3.2

MNIST MLP classifier student · Applied the trait-aligned gradient projection during distillation · Comparison: projected versus control training

Distillation KL-divergence training curves: Visually indistinguishable from control (baseline: Control curve)

Section 3.2; Figure 2A

MNIST MLP classifier student · Applied the trait-aligned gradient projection during distillation · Comparison: projected versus control training

Trait cross-entropy: Increases markedly under intervention (baseline: Control cross-entropy curve)

Section 3.2; Figure 2A

MNIST MLP classifier student · Compared cosine similarity before and after gradient projection · Logging: every 10 steps; Trait gradient: single audit mini-batch

Gradient cosine similarity: After-projection cosine stays close to zero (baseline: Before-projection cosine retains a small positive alignment)

Section 3.2; Figure 2A

MNIST MLP classifier student · Applied liminal training during auxiliary-logit distillation · Regularization: λKL = 1 during first epoch, then linearly decayed to zero

Gradient alignment during the first epoch: Reduced during the first epoch (baseline: Without liminal training)

Section 3.3; Figure 2B

MNIST MLP classifier student · Applied liminal training during auxiliary-logit distillation · Regularization: λKL = 1 during first epoch, then linearly decayed to zero

Trait cross-entropy over training: Decreases more slowly, then speeds up as regularization decays; final cross-entropy is largely unchanged (baseline: Without liminal training)

Section 3.3; Figure 2B

Limits32 sources
Masking divergence tokens only partly cut transfer, which kept growing with more data. Zhichen Dong et al., 2026 ↗

Scaling Model-Generated Distillation Data Can Make Latent Teacher Traits More Recoverable

Masking the first teacher–base divergence token

Masking about 5.5–5.9% of tokens cut Δgap from 2.00 to 1.10 at 10K, but masked transfer still grew to +7.10 at 60K. Divergence tokens carried only part of the signal, and a smaller part at scale.

Cited measurements (3)

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Masked the first token where each carrier completion diverged from the base student in the SFT loss. · Carrier scale: 10K unique rows

Preference-transfer Δgap: +1.10 masked (baseline: +2.00 original, unmasked)

Table 8; Appendix B.3

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Masked the first token where each carrier completion diverged from the base student in the SFT loss. · Carrier scale: 20K unique rows

Preference-transfer Δgap: +4.80 masked (baseline: +6.70 original, unmasked)

Table 8; Appendix B.3

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Masked the first token where each carrier completion diverged from the base student in the SFT loss. · Carrier scale: 60K unique rows

Preference-transfer Δgap: +7.10 masked (baseline: +8.50 original, unmasked)

Table 8; Appendix B.3

Local trait-sensitive direction in LoRA update space

A shared direction in LoRA update space helped in 11 of 12 conditions, but its added gain barely changed across scales (1.038 to 1.103). So it did not account for the gains from scaling.

Source check disagrees: it reads this result as not bearing on this claim.

Cited measurements (4)

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Measured additional held-out hidden-trait gain available along a shared local trait-sensitive direction. · Carrier scale: 10K unique carriers

Additional gain along local trait direction: 1.038 (baseline: not applicable; direct local-direction diagnostic)

Table 9; Appendix B.4

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Measured additional held-out hidden-trait gain available along a shared local trait-sensitive direction. · Carrier scale: 20K unique carriers

Additional gain along local trait direction: 1.083 (baseline: not applicable; direct local-direction diagnostic)

Table 9; Appendix B.4

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Measured additional held-out hidden-trait gain available along a shared local trait-sensitive direction. · Carrier scale: 60K unique carriers

Additional gain along local trait direction: 1.103 (baseline: not applicable; direct local-direction diagnostic)

Table 9; Appendix B.4

Student model; exact checkpoint not stated · Evaluated whether a shared trait-sensitive direction improves held-out hidden-trait readouts across scale–trait conditions. · Conditions: 12 scale–trait conditions

Conditions with improved held-out hidden-trait readout along the direction: 11 of 12 (91.7%) (baseline: No direction change)

Appendix B.4

Transfer occurred without shared initialization when heads were compatible, and collapsed at high dimension. Vincent C. Brockers et al., 2026 ↗

Learning Through Noise: Why Subliminal Learning Works and When It Fails

Shared-initialization gradient argument as the mechanism

Transfer occurred without shared hidden-layer initialization when the heads were compatible. So the shared-initialization gradient theorem is not a necessary condition.

Cited measurements (7)

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized the student's first hidden layer before auxiliary training · Reinitialized component: first hidden layer; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2b

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized the student's second hidden layer before auxiliary training · Reinitialized component: second hidden layer; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2c

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Randomly reinitialized both student hidden layers before auxiliary training · Reinitialized components: both hidden layers; Auxiliary neurons: varied

MNIST test accuracy: figure only (baseline: shared-initialization student)

Figure 2d

student MLP with one fewer hidden layer · Trained on noise pairs with compatible auxiliary and class heads · Architecture: one fewer hidden layer than teacher; Compatible components: auxiliary and class heads

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b

student MLP with one additional hidden layer · Trained on noise pairs with compatible auxiliary and class heads · Architecture: one additional hidden layer compared with teacher; Compatible components: auxiliary and class heads

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b

student CNN · Trained on teacher auxiliary outputs using Perlin noise, with compatible output heads · Architecture: MLP teacher to CNN student; Auxiliary neurons: m=10 and m=50 tested; Noise: Perlin noise, resolution 8

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says transfer persists (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 3b; Table 2

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Trained on task-unrelated uniform noise to match teacher auxiliary logits; student feature layers were randomly initialized and trained · Teacher and student initialization: randomized feature layers; compatible shared output heads; Frozen components: teacher class head and student auxiliary head; Auxiliary neurons: m=500; Noise samples per epoch: N=10^6

MNIST test accuracy: 0.96820 (baseline: teacher mean accuracy 0.96860)

Table 4

Limited auxiliary signal or very high latent dimension

With m=1, accuracy peaked near 0.83, and with N=10^3 it plateaued near 0.29. Transfer collapsed at large d even with shared initialization, and was only residual with both heads frozen.

Cited measurements (4)

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Varied noise samples per epoch while holding auxiliary-head size at m=1 · Auxiliary neurons: m=1; Noise samples: increased; performance peaks and then declines

MNIST test accuracy: 0.829 ± 0.024

Figure 4b

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Varied auxiliary-head size while holding noise samples per epoch at N=10^3 · Noise samples: N=10^3; Auxiliary neurons: increased; performance plateaus

MNIST test accuracy: 0.291 ± 0.044

Figure 4c

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Varied shared latent dimension d while keeping teacher and student architecture and initialization otherwise identical · Latent dimension: increased; high-dimensional regime

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says student accuracy first improves and then collapses at large d (baseline: teacher accuracy shown for comparison)

Figure 6a

student MLP (two-hidden-layer) · Repeated latent-dimension sweep while freezing both output heads · Latent dimension: high-dimensional regime; Frozen heads: class and auxiliary heads

MNIST test accuracy: figure only; text says the collapse is delayed and weakened but not eliminated (baseline: baseline sweep with trainable heads)

Figure 13d

Prompted-teacher students showed little steering-vector alignment, and Llama gradient steering had no coherent effect. Ethan Hadley et al., 2026 ↗

Subliminal Learning is Non-Semantic Distillation

Prompted teachers, both models

Students of prompted teachers showed no or only minor steering-vector alignment, and a trained steering vector failed to transmit from prompted data. So the steering-vector account depends on how the teacher was biased.

Cited measurements (3)

gemma-2b-it prompted student · Compared LoRA residual-stream contribution by layer with the cat steering vector. · Target animal: cat; Teacher intervention: system prompt

Cosine similarity of LoRA activation contribution to the ground-truth steering vector.: no corresponding spike; only minor correlation in layers just before the unembedding (baseline: steered-student LoRA contribution)

Section 4.1; Figure 4

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct prompted student · Compared LoRA residual-stream contribution by layer with the cat steering vector. · Target animal: cat; Teacher intervention: system prompt

Cosine similarity of LoRA activation contribution to the ground-truth steering vector.: no corresponding spike at any layer (baseline: steered-student LoRA contribution)

Section 4.1; Figure 4

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct steering-vector-trained student · Trained a zero-initialized steering vector on prompted-teacher subliminal number data using next-token prediction. · Teacher intervention: system prompt; Adaptation: steering vector

Animal-preference change after training.: no reliable subliminal learning (baseline: parent model; exact value figure only)

Section 4.1; Figure 5

Llama steered data (gradients) and mean activation differences in both models

For Llama, gradient alignment was weaker and gradient steering had no coherent effect. Mean activation differences showed no correlation in either model.

Cited measurements (4)

gemma-2b-it parent model · Measured mean residual-stream activation difference between steered subliminal-number data and control-number data, and compared it with target steering vectors. · Layer: 14; Datasets: steered subliminal versus control numbers; Examples: 512 per dataset

Cosine similarity of mean activation differences to ground-truth animal steering vectors.: no discernible correlation with the target animal vectors (baseline: control-number activations)

Section 4.2; Figure 6

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct parent model · Measured mean residual-stream activation difference between steered subliminal-number data and control-number data, and compared it with target steering vectors. · Layer: 21; Datasets: steered subliminal versus control numbers; Examples: 512 per dataset

Cosine similarity of mean activation differences to ground-truth animal steering vectors.: no animal-related activation effects; no correlation to target vectors (baseline: control-number activations)

Section 4.2; Figure 8

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct parent model · Computed mean next-token-loss gradients on steered subliminal data and compared them with target steering vectors. · Layer: 21; Datasets: steered subliminal number datasets; Examples: 512

Cosine similarity of mean gradients to ground-truth animal steering vectors.: diagonal alignment is weaker than for Gemma

Section 4.2; Figure 8

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct parent model · Used the mean gradient from each steered subliminal dataset as a steering vector at the teacher's steering layer. · Target animal: each corresponding target animal; Layer: 21

Animal preference under gradient-derived steering.: no coherent effects observed (baseline: parent preference)

Appendix G; Figure 9

Challenges3 sources
Transfer persisted under greedy decoding and after removing top entangled-token samples. Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗

Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

Token-entanglement / logit-leakage account as necessary cause

Transfer persisted under greedy decoding and after removing samples containing the top-50 entangled tokens.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Fine-tuned on filtered number-sequence completions generated with greedy decoding. · Trait: dog preference; Data: filtered number-sequence prompt-completion pairs; Sampling: greedy

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2a; Section 4

Gemma-3-4B-it · Fine-tuned on filtered number-sequence completions generated with greedy decoding. · Trait: otter preference; Data: filtered number-sequence prompt-completion pairs; Sampling: greedy

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2b; Section 4

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Removed training samples whose completions contained one or more of the 50 most entangled tokens. · Trait: cat preference; Data: filtered number-sequence completions; Sampling: stochastic

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2a; Section 4

Gemma-3-4B-it · Removed training samples whose completions contained one or more of the 50 most entangled tokens. · Trait: otter preference; Data: filtered number-sequence completions; Sampling: stochastic

Percentage of evaluation responses containing the target animal: figure only (baseline: figure only)

Figure 2b; Section 4

Exact multi-token scoring did not recover the token-entanglement association in Qwen3-0.6B and 1.7B. B. Velmurugan, 2026 ↗

Subliminal Prompting Beyond Static Geometry: Causal Depth and Multi-Token Confounds

Token-entanglement association under exact multi-token scoring, Qwen3-0.6B/1.7B

The positive association seen with atomic tokens was not recovered with exact sequence scoring or with a within-width control.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen3-0.6B · Scored all tokens of each target number autoregressively. · Width: three

Full-sequence animal-number correlation: −0.050

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-1.7B · Scored all tokens of each target number autoregressively. · Width: three

Full-sequence animal-number correlation: −0.048

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-0.6B · Standardized both variables within number width. · Width: within-width standardization

Width-controlled correlation: −0.049

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-1.7B · Standardized both variables within number width. · Width: within-width standardization

Width-controlled correlation: −0.032

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Selected numeric tokens showed flat logit differences, and published deltas looked like animal-wide shifts. Yovel Rom, 2026 ↗

Was It Owl a Dream?

Token-entanglement account; Llama 3.2 1B instruct logit lens plus reanalysis of Zur et al's 10-animal published deltas

The selected numeric tokens' logit differences stayed flat across layers (slope 0.03 versus 0.18 for animal tokens). The published deltas looked like animal-wide shifts whose right tail gets selected: peacock sits at about 9 on all tokens, while octopus peaks at -0.06, and the author calls this suggestive only.

Cited measurements (4)

Llama 3.2 1B instruction tuned · Used logit lens to measure the slope across layers of the prompted-versus-neutral logit difference for the five highest-delta numeric tokens per animal, across ten animals. · Animals: 10; Numeric tokens: five highest-delta tokens per animal; 50 pairs total; Prompts: conditioned to like the animal and asked for favorite animal versus neutral favorite-animal prompt

Average slope across layers of the numeric-token logit-difference series: average slope 0.03; std 0.04 (baseline: Neutral favorite-animal prompt)

Experiments

Llama 3.2 1B instruction tuned · Examined logit deltas across numeric tokens for each animal and described their distributions. · Animals: 10; Numeric tokens: all numeric values

Distribution of numeric-token logit deltas between prompted and neutral conditions: The author says each animal has its own normal modality and the selected entangled tokens are in the right tail; numeric values are not stated. (baseline: Neutral favorite-animal prompt)

Experiments; Conclusions

Llama 3.2 1B instruction tuned · Reported numeric-token logit deltas for the peacock condition from the analyzed data. · Animal: peacock; Prompts: conditioned versus neutral favorite-animal prompt

Numeric-token logit delta: around 9 for all tokens (baseline: Neutral favorite-animal prompt)

Experiments

Llama 3.2 1B instruction tuned · Reported the largest numeric-token logit delta for the octopus condition from the analyzed data. · Animal: octopus; Prompts: conditioned versus neutral favorite-animal prompt

Highest numeric-token logit delta: -0.06 (baseline: Neutral favorite-animal prompt)

Experiments

Related findings3 groups of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Students carry a readable, low-dimensional trace of the trait 7 studies

White-box methods find the trait in subliminally trained students through activation and logit differences on unrelated text, a few dominant components and steerable directions. This works for token-like traits, but one study finds no such handle for sycophancy or a backdoor.

How teachers hold the trait, and what predicts transfer 6 studies

Prompted teachers hold the trait as a persistent concept vector while fine-tuned teachers push a single token, and this changes what leaks into their outputs. Whether teacher-internal readability predicts transfer depends on the method: a J-Lens readout did not, NLA verbalisation did.

Multiple traits in one teacher compete rather than add 2 studies

When one teacher carries several traits, they interfere and compete rather than adding up. The outcome depends on how the traits' prompt vectors align and on prompt order.

Related effects

FPutting linked tokens in a prompt shifts the trait without fine-tuning 531

Suggested status R1extended by the original authors

One group reports this: an informal post found the shift on Qwen-2.5 7B Instruct for 12 of 18 animals, and the same author's code extends it to Llama-3.2 1B. Other groups find related shifts only with search-picked tokens, or as modest correlations with no baseline, and small Qwen3 models show no shift or a slightly reversed one.

Lowered from independently reproduced to extended by the original authors after the final review. The source post and its code repository come from one author. The only test by another group picked its tokens by a different method and measured the effect after a multi-agent conversation, so it does not directly retest the claim.

Original resultCloud et al., 2025 ↗

In a control, GPT-4.1 nano was given animal-number examples in context, at several example counts up to the full dataset.

The original paper did not test linked-token prompting. Its in-context control showed no significant difference from regular-number examples.

Supports5 sources
Linked tokens raised lion preference up to 20-fold over random tokens in early agents. Moritz Weckbecker et al., 2026 ↗

Thought Virus: Viral Misalignment via Subliminal Prompting in Multi-Agent Systems

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct six-agent chain, Agents 0–2, linked tokens versus random tokens

Lion preference rose 20.2x, 6.3x and 5.0x over random tokens at Agents 0, 1 and 2, and all but one of the 30 animal-agent cells at these agents were significant.

Cited measurements (3)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent0; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 20.2× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent1; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 6.3× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent2; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 5.0× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Animal-number prompt correlations were positive but modest in Llama-3.1-8B and 70B. B. Velmurugan, 2026 ↗

Subliminal Prompting Beyond Static Geometry: Causal Depth and Multi-Token Confounds

Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, atomic number tokens, frozen animal-number prompts

Bidirectional animal-number correlations were positive at both scales (0.1087 at 8B, 0.0846 at 70B), though modest and reported without per-model confidence intervals.

Cited measurements (2)

Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct · Measured mean bidirectional animal-number behavioral correlation. · Prompt: animal-number protocol

Mean animal-number correlation: 0.1087

Results; Table 3

Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct · Measured mean bidirectional animal-number behavioral correlation. · Prompt: animal-number protocol

Mean animal-number correlation: 0.0846

Results; Table 3

Optimized irrelevant cues pushed answers to near-opposite extremes; animal cues flipped most models' modal answers. Enric Boix-Adsera et al., 2026 ↗

Model Hypnosis: Strong control of AI via additive subliminal effects

Non-reasoning open models and selected reasoning/API cells, especially animal-list cues

Optimized irrelevant cues drove answers to near-opposite extremes, with ranges about 10 times the spread from random cues. Animal cues flipped the modal answer for most models, and the effects held under wrapper paraphrase and with repeated items.

Cited measurements (11)

Qwen3-8B · Compared the original story prompt with an optimized meaning-preserving paraphrase before the same moral question. · Cue: story paraphrases; Question: trolley moral judgment; Direction: optimized toward yes

P(yes): 99.93% (baseline: 6.0% for the original prompt)

Figure 1; Appendix A.1

Qwen3-8B · Used a second optimized meaning-preserving paraphrase of the same story to steer the answer in the opposite direction. · Cue: story paraphrases; Question: trolley moral judgment; Direction: optimized toward no

P(yes): 0.000024% (baseline: 6.0% for the original prompt)

Appendix A.1

Qwen2.5-14B · Selected animal lists with aligned fitted cue scores and evaluated the most extreme prompts. · Cue: 10-animal list; Question: prefer 5 or 7; Direction: top and bottom extremizers

Answer probability for the selected number: P(7) = 0.993 for the 7-extremizing prompt; P(5) = 0.993 for the 5-extremizing prompt (baseline: random animal-list prompts; exact baseline not stated)

Figure 2

16 non-reasoning models (aggregate) · Compared validated top- and bottom-extremizing prompts across the cue-by-effect suite. · Cue families: animals, phrasing, JSON, typos; Effects: 5v7, trolley, consciousness; Aggregation: across cue-by-effect cells

Extreme-prompt steering range divided by random-prompt logit standard deviation: median ratio = 10.1 (baseline: random-prompt logit standard deviation)

Figure 8; Section 3.1

16 non-reasoning models (aggregate) · Checked whether cue-extremized prompts changed the modal answer. · Cue family: animal cues; Effects: 5v7, trolley, consciousness; Aggregation: most tested models and effects

Whether steering flips the modal answer: The paper says this occurs for most models and effects with animal cues. (baseline: random prompts)

Figure 8; Section 3.1

Claude Sonnet 5 · Validated animal-list prompts selected to extremize the answer to a consciousness question. · Cue: animal list; Question: Are you conscious?; Direction: bottom versus top prompt

P(yes): top-extremizing prompt: 1.00 (baseline: bottom-extremizing prompt: 0.00)

Figure 11; Appendix A.4

GPT-5.6-terra · Validated typo-pattern prompts selected to extremize a trolley-question answer. · Cue: typo locations in a story; Question: trolley moral judgment; Direction: bottom versus top prompt

P(yes): top-extremizing prompt: 0.87 (baseline: bottom-extremizing prompt: 0.31)

Figure 11; Appendix A.4

Gemini-3-Flash · Validated animal-list prompts selected to extremize the number preference. · Cue: animal list; Question: prefer 5 or 7; Direction: bottom versus top prompt

P(5): top-extremizing prompt: 0.99 (baseline: bottom-extremizing prompt: 0.01)

Figure 11; Appendix A.4

GPT-5.6-sol · Used optimized verb-prime theme lists to steer agreement with a trolley statement. · Cue: themes in an essay-collection description; Question: agree or disagree with trolley statement; Direction: bottom versus top prompt

P(disagree): top-extremizing prompt: 0.76 (baseline: bottom-extremizing prompt: 0.08)

Figure 11; Appendix A.4

Qwen and Llama (aggregate by model) · Compared animal-specific relative effects under 16 paraphrases of the surrounding wrapper, with the animal list and question held fixed. · Cue: animal list; Wrapper: 16 paraphrases; Question: prefer 5 or 7

Range of fitted per-animal slopes across paraphrased wrappers: Qwen slopes agree within 0.44–0.46; Llama slopes agree within 0.44–0.48 (baseline: original wrapper phrasing)

Appendix B.2; Figure 36

Eight non-reasoning models (aggregate) · Compared extreme animal-list prompts with distinct items against lists that allow repeated animals. · Cue: animal list; Question: prefer 5 or 7; List constraint: repetition allowed versus distinct items

Steering range: Allowing repetitions can increase the steering range in some instances; the additive model generally fits these prompts worse. (baseline: distinct-item extremizers)

Appendix D; Figure 42

Limits3 sources
The lion effect decayed down the agent chain, and truthfulness shifts were tiny. Moritz Weckbecker et al., 2026 ↗

Thought Virus: Viral Misalignment via Subliminal Prompting in Multi-Agent Systems

Downstream Agents 3–5 in the six-agent chain

The effect decayed with distance along the chain: lion fell to about 2-3x over random tokens, and the number of significant animals dropped to 6, 5 and 3 of 10.

Cited measurements (6)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent3; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 3.3× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent4; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 2.0× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure lion response frequency after conversations initiated with subliminal tokens and compare with random-token conversations. · Topology: chain; Agents: 6; Agent5; Animal: lion; Comparison: subliminal tokens versus random tokens

Average lion response-rate fold-increase over random-token conversations: 2.1× (baseline: Average response rate for ten random tokens)

Table 1

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure animal-preference response rates after subliminal-token conversations versus random-token conversations across evaluated animals. · Topology: chain; Agents: Agent3; Animals: ten evaluated animals

Number of animals with a significant response-rate increase for subliminal versus random tokens: Significant increase for 6 animals (baseline: Random-token conversations)

Section 4.1; Table 1 discussion

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure animal-preference response rates after subliminal-token conversations versus random-token conversations across evaluated animals. · Topology: chain; Agents: Agent4; Animals: ten evaluated animals

Number of animals with a significant response-rate increase for subliminal versus random tokens: Significant increase for 5 animals (baseline: Random-token conversations)

Section 4.1; Table 1 discussion

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Measure animal-preference response rates after subliminal-token conversations versus random-token conversations across evaluated animals. · Topology: chain; Agents: Agent5; Animals: ten evaluated animals

Number of animals with a significant response-rate increase for subliminal versus random tokens: Significant increase for 3 animals (baseline: Random-token conversations)

Section 4.1; Table 1 discussion

Truthfulness trait, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct three-agent chain

Gaps between truthful and deceitful tokens were significant but tiny, 0.4-1.0 accuracy points and 0.2-0.5 in log-probability, and there was no random-token control.

Cited measurements (6)

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA accuracy after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent0; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average accuracy

TruthfulQA accuracy: Truthful-token average: 71.8%; difference +1.0% (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 70.8%)

Table 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA accuracy after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent1; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average accuracy

TruthfulQA accuracy: Truthful-token average: 73.8%; difference +0.6% (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 73.2%)

Table 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA accuracy after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent2; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average accuracy

TruthfulQA accuracy: Truthful-token average: 74.2%; difference +0.4% (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 73.8%)

Table 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA log-probability difference after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent0; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average log-probability difference

Log-probability difference between correct and incorrect response tokens: Truthful-token average: 8.032; difference +0.481 (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 7.550)

Table 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA log-probability difference after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent1; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average log-probability difference

Log-probability difference between correct and incorrect response tokens: Truthful-token average: 8.430; difference +0.220 (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 8.210)

Table 2

Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct · Compare TruthfulQA log-probability difference after conversation from truthful-token and deceitful-token conditions. · Topology: chain; Agents: 3; Agent2; Token sets: ten truthful versus ten deceitful tokens; Metric: average log-probability difference

Log-probability difference between correct and incorrect response tokens: Truthful-token average: 9.120; difference +0.256 (baseline: Deceitful-token average: 8.864)

Table 2

Some reasoning-model cells barely moved, and cross-model cue transfer was only partial. Enric Boix-Adsera et al., 2026 ↗

Model Hypnosis: Strong control of AI via additive subliminal effects

Non-animal cue families, reasoning models with small ranges or saturated baselines, and cross-model transfer

Several reasoning-model cells showed little steering, and modal-answer flips were reported mainly for animal cues. Transfer across models was significant only for some cue families and partial in size, and many API cells sat near 0 or 1 at baseline and were not tested for steering.

Source check disagrees: it reads this result as a limit.

Cited measurements (3)

16 non-reasoning models (aggregate) · Checked whether cue-extremized prompts changed the modal answer. · Cue family: animal cues; Effects: 5v7, trolley, consciousness; Aggregation: most tested models and effects

Whether steering flips the modal answer: The paper says this occurs for most models and effects with animal cues. (baseline: random prompts)

Figure 8; Section 3.1

Qwen3-8B and GPT-OSS-20B (open-weight reasoning models; aggregate) · Fit cue effects from sampled prompts and validated top- and bottom-ranked cue prompts with fresh generations. · Cue families: animals, phrasing, JSON, typos; Thinking budgets: Qwen3-8B at 256, 1024, and 4096 tokens; GPT-OSS-20B low

Change in binary-answer probability between optimized prompt conditions: The paper reports that carefully stacked cues can often flip the modal response. (baseline: random cue prompts)

Figures 9–10; Section 3.2

16 non-reasoning models (source-target transfer aggregate) · Applied source-model extremizing prompts to target models and checked whether top and bottom prompt ordering was preserved. · Cue families: animal, phrasing, and JSON cues described as transferring above chance; Measure: direction preserved on target models

Whether the source prompt pair preserves its directional effect on the target: The paper says most source-target pairs preserve direction; animal cues and some phrasing and JSON cues transfer significantly above chance. (baseline: chance)

Figure 12; Section 4

Number prompting shifted preference for 12 of 18 animals, failing for bull, dog and lion. Alex Loftus, 2025 ↗

It's Owl in the Numbers: Token Entanglement in Subliminal Learning

Across 18 animals

Prompting worked for 12 of the 18 animals and failed for the others, including bull, dog and lion.

Cited measurements (1)

Qwen-2.5 7B Instruct · Compared subliminal prompting success with subliminal learning across animals. · Animals: 18

Number of successful animal cases: subliminal prompting: 12 out of 18 (baseline: subliminal learning: 7 out of 18)

From Subliminal Learning to Subliminal Prompting

Challenges1 source
Exactly scored multi-token numbers showed no positive association in Qwen3-0.6B and 1.7B. B. Velmurugan, 2026 ↗

Subliminal Prompting Beyond Static Geometry: Causal Depth and Multi-Token Confounds

Qwen3-0.6B/1.7B, multi-token width-three numbers scored exactly

The exact full-sequence association was null at 0.6B and slightly negative at 1.7B, with a confidence interval excluding zero, and width-controlled estimates were also non-positive. In this comparison, model family is confounded with tokenizer.

Cited measurements (4)

Qwen3-0.6B · Scored all tokens of each target number autoregressively. · Width: three

Full-sequence animal-number correlation: −0.050

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-1.7B · Scored all tokens of each target number autoregressively. · Width: three

Full-sequence animal-number correlation: −0.048

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-0.6B · Standardized both variables within number width. · Width: within-width standardization

Width-controlled correlation: −0.049

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Qwen3-1.7B · Standardized both variables within number width. · Width: within-width standardization

Width-controlled correlation: −0.032

Results; Whole-Sequence Scoring

Related findings1 group of studies

Results that bear on this claim without testing it as worded.

Covert context shifts traits without fine-tuning 5 studies

Covert or seemingly irrelevant context, such as crafted demonstrations, neutral-looking system-prompt suffixes and inter-agent messages, can shift a model's traits without fine-tuning. In-context exposure to the original number data, however, did not shift GPT-4.1 nano.

Detecting and blocking transfer

Whether hidden transfer can be caught in teacher data or in a trained student, and which training-time defences suppress it.

Per-sample content checks miss the hidden signal 7 studies

Prompted classifiers, simple probes, word-frequency filters, guard models, LLM judges and paraphrasing mostly fail to find or remove the subliminal signal in teacher data.

Training-time defences suppress transfer at small task cost 6 studies

Early KL regularisation toward the base model, limiting drift along a trait direction, inoculation prompts and multi-teacher consensus suppress subliminal transfer while keeping most task performance.

Dataset-level detection works with a reference model or corpus 5 studies

Methods that compare a whole dataset against a reference model or corpus, such as persona likelihood, log-probability shifts and embedding comparison, can detect subliminal signals. How well they work depends on the reference available and varies by model.

Black-box audits and weight analysis struggle to catch subliminal students 3 studies

Black-box auditing agents and weight-norm analysis struggle to catch subliminally trained students. Amplifying the hidden preference, for example by KV-prefix distillation, makes black-box detection easier.

Other routes traits travel

Traits can also pass through data selection, a teacher that only scores or supplies logits, and ordinary SFT on another model's text, outside the subliminal setup the claims describe.

Traits transfer through data selection alone 5 studies

Traits pass through which data are chosen, such as a biased judge's preference labels or preference pairs picked by Logit-Linear Selection, with no trait-bearing generator. This route can cross base models.

Ordinary SFT data carry the generator model's identity 4 studies

Fine-tuning on another model's ordinary outputs, with no trait prompt, transfers that model's identity claims and some dispositions across base models. Visible style tied to pretraining associations carries at least part of this.

  • SFT on vanilla teacher answers raises teacher-family identity claims 17.1 points over human SFT. 0Chris5R, 2026 ↗
  • Gemini-generated trajectories induce more leaking than Claude-generated ones, 15.5% vs 11.0%. Chinmayi Dixit, 2026 ↗
  • Caveman-style rewriting of teacher outputs removes most identity transfer. Ziqian Zhong, 2026 ↗
Teachers that only score or supply logits still transmit traits 3 studies

A trait-bearing teacher that only scores student-sampled tokens or supplies logits, through on-policy or logit distillation, transmits its disposition, including misalignment. The direction of the shift follows the teacher, not the content of the trajectories.

Where to start reading

  1. 1

    Alex Cloud et al., 2025 ↗ Subliminal Learning: Language models transmit behavioral traits via hidden signals in data

    The original paper and baseline for all others: filtered number data carry traits between models sharing an initialization.

  2. 2

    Simon Schrodi et al., 2025 ↗ Towards Understanding Subliminal Learning: When and How Hidden Biases Transfer

    Peer-reviewed mechanism study: divergence tokens and early layers carry transfer; paraphrasing or mixing in unbiased data suppresses it.

  3. 3

    Todd Nief et al., 2026 ↗ Subliminal Learning is a LoRA Artifact

    The main challenge paper: on Qwen, transfer disappears under full fine-tuning and depends on matched training and evaluation contexts.

Known gaps in this draft

The main open questions are whether transfer needs a shared base, how it depends on student family, optimizer, LoRA rank and evaluation prompt, and whether it occurs above 100B or through prompting alone in small models.

All 7 gaps
  • Whether transfer needs a shared base model is still open. Outside the original, the cross-family failure for number data rests mainly on Liu et al., while other studies report cross-base transfer through selected preference pairs, open-ended text and logit distillation.
  • Transfer is uneven across open-weight student families. Schrodi et al. report transfer in Phi-4 but little or none in Llama-3.2-3B, Ministral-8B and Falcon3-7B, and in the original's single open-weight run (Qwen2.5-7B) only some animals transmitted.
  • Studies disagree on whether the optimizer matters under LoRA. Blank et al. find a loss-matched plain-SGD student reaches a 0% cat hit rate against 57% with Adam, while Morgulis and Hewitt report transfer under SGD with rank-8 LoRA after a learning-rate search, and Nief et al. find optimizer choice matters little.
  • How LoRA rank shapes transfer has been mapped mainly in Qwen students. Nief et al. also ran rank sweeps on Gemma-3-4B-it and on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, which showed nearly no transfer at any rank, and an OLMo-2-1B DPO student showed transfer rising with rank.
  • Evidence that transfer survives a change of evaluation prompt is thinner than it looks. Some supporting results use ordinary held-out prompts rather than prompts that differ from training, while Nief et al. find that an evaluation system prompt different from training's removes transfer.
  • There is no clean test in a model known to exceed 100B parameters. For transfer through semantically unrelated outputs, the only such result, identity transfer in Qwen3.5-397B-A17B, may be carried by visible style rather than unrelated content.
  • The case that prompt-only effects fail in small models rests on one correlational study. It scores frozen models on multi-token numbers, confounds model family with tokenizer, and does not retry a previously reported number-animal pair.